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Taking History Seriously: Reflections on a Critique of Amar’s Treatment of the
Ninth Amendment in His Work on the Bill of Rights
Thomas B. McAffee *
Introduction
The contemporary debate over modern textualism 1 has prompted some to question
whether a “close reading” of constitutional text – of the sort engaged in by textualism’s
proponents – can be an adequate guide to original meaning. 2 Advocates of textualism, in an
effort to obtain the original public meaning, or understanding, of constitutional text, “closely
parse the Constitution’s words and grammar and the placement of clauses in the document,”

*

Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas.
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1

See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 621 (1990)
(coining the phrase and reviewing the theory both critically and historically); Nicholas S.
Zeppos, Justice Scalia’s Textualism: The “New” New Legal Process, 12 Cardozo L. Rev. 1597,
1599 (1991) (describing textualism as “a reaction against the legal process theory set forth by
Henry Hart and Albert Sacks”). An important scholarly proponent of textualism as a method of
constitutional interpretation is Yale Law School’s Akhil Amar, a fact that prompted the
publication of a legal symposium dedicated to exploring the implications of his book on the Bill
of Rights to the project of interpreting the Constitution. See Symposium: Textualism and the
Constitution, 66 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1061-1373 (1998).
Dean Treanor observes that both Justices Scalia and Thomas “champion this interpretive
approach,” along with “a cadre of influential academics, Akhil Amar most prominently among
them.” William Michael Treanor, Taking Text too Seriously: Modern Textualism, Original
Meaning, and the Case of Amar’s Bill of Rights, 106 Mich. L. Rev. 487, 487 (2007) [hereinafter
cited as Taking Text too Seriously].
2

Treanor, Taking Text too Seriously, supra note 1. Textualism refers to “the school of
thought that seeks to construe the Constitution in accordance with the original meaning of the
text.” Id. at 496. It requires “a search for the public meaning of the text at the time that text was
written and ratified,” as contrasted with originalism’s “search for the subjective intent of
particular sets of historical actors.” Id.
1
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assuming “that this close parsing recaptures original meaning.” 3 In a recent article, Dean
Treanor suggests that “perhaps because it seems obviously correct, that assumption has neither
been defended nor challenged.” 4 The alternative view, and the one offered by Dean Treanor, is
that a careful review of the history leading to the adoption of the language at issue, and even of
the “drafting history,” often is essential to the discovery of the original understanding of the
text. 5 Textualism is not invariably the best way to find the original meaning.
Perhaps Dean Treanor’s most important, and seemingly compelling, illustration of this
fundamental critique of textualism relates directly to Professor Amar’s interpretation of the Ninth
and Tenth Amendments in his well-known book, The Bill of Rights: Creation and
Reconstruction. 6 Treanor offers a number of reasons to think that Amar placed undue weight on
the placement of the Ninth and Tenth Amendments together, at the end of the Bill of Rights,
while neglecting the evidence revealing that referring to the rights of “the people” was often a
way to speak of purely individual (as contrasted with collective) rights. 7 The purpose of this
article is to embrace the basic critique of textualism presented by Dean Treanor, agreeing that
sometimes text can accurately be understood only in the context of the history that produced that
3

Id. at 487.

4

Id.

5

Id.

6

Professor Amar’s treatment of the Ninth and Tenth Amendments as the “Popular
Sovereignty Amendments” is found at pp. 119-133 of his 1998 book. Dean Treanor focused
attention on Professor Amar because “[a]s the preeminent textualist scholar, Amar is an
appropriate representative of the methodology.” Treanor, Taking Text too Seriously, supra note
1, at 492.
7

Treanor, Taking Text too Seriously, supra note 1, at 508-519.
2
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text; at the same time, this article will defend the view that Akhil Amar properly read that history
as revealing the Ninth Amendment as designed to secure the other rights retained by virtue of the
enumerated and limited powers scheme we call our federal system.
In Part I that follows, I sketch out Dean Treanor’s criticism of Amar’s treatment of the
Ninth and Tenth Amendments, and the grounds on which he concludes that it illustrates the
pitfalls of constitutional textualism. Parts II through VI reviews: (1) the history leading to the
adoption of the Ninth Amendment (Part II); (2) the conventional objection to reading the Ninth
Amendment as being, like the Tenth, a federalism-rooted provision (Part III); (3) the relation of
natural rights and constitutional positivism to the Ninth Amendment (Part IV); (4) the Ninth
Amendment and post-adoption evidence; (5) the relation between the Ninth Amendment and
modern positivism (Part V). The materials reviewed demonstrate that a close reading of the
constitutional text must be aided by a reading of that text in historical context. But when read in
historical context, it becomes quite clear that the framers did not intend to impose unenumerated
fundamental rights, even on the national government.
I.
Summarizing the Critique of Amar on the Ninth Amendment
By contrast to Treanor’s preferred approach, although Amar manages to not completely
ignore the “drafting history and textual usages outside the constitutional document,” he
“relegates these evidentiary sources to secondary importance.” 8 Instead, Amar ’s “central focus
is on the text, and it is assumed that close reading yields original meaning.” 9 Moreover, “the
8

Id. at 491.

9

Id.
3

Ninth Amendment is primarily concerned,” says Amar, “not with the protection of individual
rights, but rather with the people’s right to alter or abolish government.” 10 Hence the
amendment’s language referring to “‘the people’ ha[s] a conspicuously collective meaning.” 11
In Dean Treanor’s mind, Amar begins to go astray when “he stresses location” in
analyzing the meaning of particular texts – “and in particular the fact that the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments are next to each other and should thus be read together.”12 Indeed, Amar refers to
the Ninth and Tenth Amendments – even in the title of a chapter in his book – as “The Popular
Sovereignty Amendments,” concluding that the Ninth “was ‘a federalism clause intertwined with
the Tenth Amendment,’ and it ‘began as republican affirmation of collective rights of the
people.’” 13 The problem is that this “assumes that location is a powerful guide to determining
meaning and that meaning can be deduced from looking at the finished document rather than
from probing drafting history.”14 But the location of the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, as right
“next to each other”in the federal Bill of Rights, “was a coincidence,” considering that Madison
proposed amendments to be “inserted into the constitutional document, not added to the end.”15

10

Id. at 493.

11

Id.

12

Id.

13

Id. at 508 (citing AKHIL REED AMAR , THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND
RECONSTRUCTION 119, 280 (1998) [hereinafter cited as CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION].)
14

Id. at 508-09.

15

Id. at 509. Moreover, he reminds us, “the predecessors of the Ninth and Tenth
Amendment were at very different places on [Madison’s] list of amendments.” Id.
4

Treanor concludes: “They eventually wound up together because of a series of legislative
decisions having nothing to do with a sense they were linked.” 16
Madison’s proposed Ninth and Tenth Amendments would have been placed “at almost
opposite ends of the document.” 17 His Tenth Amendment “would have been combined with a
separation-of-powers provision to form the penultimate article of the Constitution,” while his
Ninth Amendment would have been “the final provision in a series of ten provisions that he
sought to insert in Article I, Section 9 between Clause 3 and Clause 4.” 18 These protected rights
“followed the two clauses of the unamended Constitution that protect rights against
congressional infringement–the suspension of Habeas Corpus Clause and the Bill of AttainderEx Post Facto Clause.” 19 Treanor thus contends that when the Ninth Amendment is “viewed in
relation to the amendments that preceded them in Madison’s proposal, Madison’s Ninth
Amendment clearly protected individual as well as group rights.” 20 Treanor concludes that the

16

Id.

17

Id. at 514.

18

Id. at 514.

19

Id.

20

Id. The question, of course, does not really concern whether the Ninth Amendment was
intended to protect “individual rights,” but precisely how the protection was to occur. Article II
of the Articles of Confederation retained for each state “every Power, Jurisdiction and right,
which is not by this confederation expressly delegated to the United States.” 1 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 86 (Merrill Jensen ed.,
1976) [hereinafter RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION]. But that provision protected individual
rights only indirectly by securing state control of those rights unless national jurisdiction had
been expressly granted. See infra notes 36-40 and accompanying text.
5

“history of their evolution indicates that the Ninth and Tenth Amendments were not understood
as a unit and that no one conceived of them as belonging together.” 21
Dean Treanor acknowledges that “collective rights were part of the Ninth Amendment’s
‘rights . . . retained by the people,’” but is emphatic that Amar’s claim that the amendment
“began as a republican affirmation of collective rights of the people” is wrong “because it denies
that the amendment was fundamentally concerned with the protection of individual rights.” 22
Accordingly, Amar “ignores evidence of the demand for protection of individual rights, a
demand that was at least as strongly pressed.” 23
Thus, says Treanor, Amar fails even to discuss “the opening lines of” the Virginia
Ratifying Convention’s resolution proposing amendments:
That there be a Declaration or Bill of Rights asserting and securing from
encroachment the essential and unalienable Rights of the People in some such
manner as the following:
FIRST, That there are certain natural rights of which men, when they form a
social compact cannot deprive or divest their posterity, among which are the
enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring, possessing and
protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety. 24
21

Id. at 518.

22

Id. at 508.

23

Id. at 509.

24

Id. at 511-12 (quoting Amendments Proposed by the Virginia Convention (June 27,
1788), in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DOCUMENTARY RECORD FROM THE FIRST
CONGRESS 17 (Helen E. Veit et al. eds., 1991) [hereinafter cited as DOCUMENTARY RECORD]. Cf.
3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION 657-661 (J. ELLIOT 2d ed. 1866) [hereinafter cited as ELLIOT’S DEBATES].
6

Virginia “thus opens with a request for an amendment recognizing ‘natural rights,’” which “are
principally, if not wholly, rights of the individuals, not the group.” 25 The same document “put
these individual rights on a list of ‘the essential and unalienable Rights of the People.’” 26
Treanor also reminds us that New York – “the other state whose ratification history Amar
invokes – also proposed a series of constitutional amendments sounding in natural rights,
although it is omitted from Amar’s account.”27 As with Virginia, in New York we gather, says
Treanor, that “the state ratifying convention was seeking protection of individual rights.” 28
What all this ultimately means, Treanor tells us, is that Amar never acknowledges that the
amendments proposed by the state ratifying conventions “reflected the usage under which
individual rights were rights of the people.” 29 So he emphasizes the right to alter and abolish
government even as he completely ignores the “proposed amendments regarding the natural right
to pursue life, liberty, and happiness.” 30 “The evidence indicates,” moreover, “that individual
25

Treanor, Taking Text too Seriously, supra note 1, at 512.

26

Id. (quoting Amendments Proposed by the Virginia Convention, in DOCUMENTARY
RECORD, supra note 24, at 17.).
27

Id.

28

Id. at 513. Treanor notes that “New York also requested an amendment in which the
individual right to conscience was formulated as a ‘right’ of the ‘People.’” Id. (quoting
Amendments Proposed by the New York Convention (July 26, 1788), in DOCUMENTORY
RECORD, supra note 19, at 21.) He concludes: “As in Virginia, the New York Ratifying
convention considered an individual right to be a ‘right’ of the ‘People.’” Id. For the view that
the proposed New York amendment most closely related to the Ninth Amendment was combined
with the proposed amendment that eventually became the Tenth Amendment, see infra note 51
and accompanying text.
29

Id.

30

Id.
7

rights were at least as much the subject of the Ninth Amendment as the collective rights that are
the sole focus of Amar’s analysis.”31 Amar thus “ignores evidence of the demand for the
protection of individual rights, a demand that was at least as strongly pressed” as “the demand
for protection of the popular right to change governments.” 32
Treanor tracks with Professor Barnett in attributing the Ninth Amendment to a draft by a
member of the House Select Committee, Roger Sherman, and in particular his proposed Second
Amendment that sought to secure “certain natural rights.” 33

Yet he acknowledges that

Madison’s original proposal referred both to not construing “exceptions” in favor of rights to
diminish “the just importance of other rights retained by the people,” but also to not construing
those exceptions to “enlarge the powers delegated by the Constitution;” instead, the exceptions
should be construed as “either actual limitations on such powers, or as inserted merely for greater
31

Id.

32

Id. at 509. It is at this point that Treanor cites the article by Professor Barnett that
reads the Ninth Amendment both as providing for the protection of “individual rights as well as a
narrow construction of the powers of the national government.” Id., citing, Randy E. Barnett,
The Ninth Amendment: It Means What It Says, 85 Tex. L. Rev. 1 (2006) [hereinafter cited as The
Ninth Amendment]. Interestingly, however, Professor Barnett is an advocate of textualism and
is far more interested in the “public meaning” of the founders’ language than in their “intended”
meaning. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611,
623 (1999) (clarifying that he does not advocate “original intentions” originalism, but only
“original meaning” originalism that looks for how language would likely have been understood).
His interpretation of the Ninth Amendment, moreover, is clearly not based on the legislative
history that produced the amendment.
33

Roger Sherman, Proposed Committee Report (July 21-28, 1789), in Documentary
Record, supra note 24 at 266, 268. Treanor’s agreement that the Ninth Amendment was derived
from a proposal of Roger Sherman is found at Treanor, Taking Text too Seriously, supra note 2,
at 516. But see Thomas B. McAffee, Restoring the Lost World of Classical Legal Thought: The
Presumption of Liberty Over Law and the Court Over the Constitution, 75 U. CINC. L. REV.
1499, 1557-1559 (2007) [hereinafter The Court Over the Constitution]. See infra note 109 and
accompanying text
8

caution.” 34 Treanor observes, but does not explain either the reasons for the changes or its
implications, that “[t]he [House Select] Committee edited the proposal down to the first clause
and tightened the text,” meaning that its rights language “was modified to become the entire
proposal.” 35 As one who has studied and written about the Ninth Amendment for over twenty
years, I can say with some confidence that Amar’s treatment of the Ninth Amendment relates
more directly to the ratification-era debate that produced the amendment than the account
supplied by Dean Treanor.
II.
The Debate Over the Omission of a Bill of Rights
It is quite clear that the Ninth Amendment came to us because of the ratification-era
debate over the omission of a bill of rights. 36 The Federalists defended that decision by
invoking the precedent of the Articles of Confederation and its omission of any bill or
declaration of rights. 37 While the state constitutions “started with a presumption in favor of
34

Treanor, Taking Text too Seriously, supra note 1, at 514-515.

35

Id. at 516.

36

E.g., Barnett, The Ninth Amendment, supra note 32, at 7 (“During the ratification
debates over the Constitution, the principal objection made by its opponents that resonated with
the public was the absence of a bill of rights.”).
37

See, e.g., Thomas B. McAffee, Inalienable Rights, Legal Enforceability, and American
Constitutions: The Fourteenth Amendment and the Concept of Unenumerated Rights, 36 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 747, 751 (2001) [hereinafter cited as Inalienable Rights] (noting that Madison in
The Federalist No. 38 posed the question whether a Bill of Rights is “essential to liberty,” and
answered the inquiry by referring to the lack of a Bill of Rights in the Articles of Confederation).
THOMAS B. MCAFFEE, JAY S. BYBEE, & A. CHRISTOPHER BRYANT, POWERS RESERVED FOR THE
PEOPLE AND THE STATES: A HISTORY OF THE NINTH AND TENTH AMENDMENTS 29 (2006)
[hereinafter cited as POWERS RESERVED] (noting that defenders of the proposed Constitution
“relied on the example of the Articles of Confederation–a document with limited and enumerated
powers that generated no opposition from those interested in securing basic rights”).
9

government power,” 38 the framers of the federal Constitution began with the opposite
assumption: while in the states “everything which is not reserved is given,” under the proposed
Constitution “everything which is not given, is reserved.”39 The debate over the omission of a
bill of rights, then, for the Federalist proponents of the Constitution, turned on the distinction
between a government of “general” legislative powers, as held in the states, and a government of
“enumerated” legislative powers, as would be held by Congress. 40
38

McAffee, Inalienable Rights, supra note 37, at 751.

39

James Wilson’s Speech in the State House Yard (Oct. 6, 1787), in 2 RATIFICATION OF
THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 20, at 388. The elaborate argument included this:
When the people established the powers of legislation under their separate
governments, they invested their representatives with every right and authority
which they did not in explicit terms reserve; and therefore upon every question,
respecting the jurisdiction of the house of assembly, if the frame of government is
silent, the jurisdiction is efficient and complete. But in delegating federal powers,
another criterion was necessarily introduced, and the congressional authority is to
be collected, not from tacit implication, but from the positive grant expressed in
the instrument of union. Hence it evident, that in the former case [of the states]
every thing which is not reserved is given, but in the latter [case of the federal
Constitution] the reverse of the proposition prevails, and everything which is not
given, is reserved.
Id. Where “every thing which is not reserved is given,” id., a bill of rights is needed so that
essential rights are retained. See infra note 200 and accompanying text (James Iredell
recognizing necessity of a bill of rights as to a government of general legislative powers).
40

By contrast, Professor Barnett insists that the legislative power even of the states was
limited by the rights “retained” as individuals left the state of nature and joined the social
contract–though apparently not initially as a matter of federal constitutional law. See Randy E.
Barnett, The Proper Scope of the Police Power, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 429, 433 (2004)
(concluding that “the unlimited or plenary power construction of the police power is inconsistent
with both the text and original meaning of the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments”).
Considering that Barnett acknowledges that neither the federal Bill of Rights, nor the Ninth
Amendment, acted in any way to limit the states’ police powers, one can only imagine that
Barnett simply assumes that the natural liberty rights he takes as “retained” by the Ninth
Amendment would equally serve to limit state legislative police powers–at least as a matter of
10

A significant problem was that the Antifederalist opponents of the Constitution did not
accept the idea that the Constitution created a government of limited, defined powers, rather than
one of “general” powers. Thus Thomas Jefferson, who supported adding a Bill of Rights,
responded to Wilson’s argument from enumerated powers by noting that the proposed
Constitution omitted Article II of the Articles of Confederation, or an equivalent provision. 41
Article II had provided that each State “retains every Power, Jurisdiction and right, which is not
by this confederation expressly delegated to the United States.”42 It was the importance of
Article II in the minds of Antifederalist opponents of the Constitution that explains why the
provision that eventually became the Tenth Amendment was proposed by every state ratifying
convention that proposed an amendment.43
The reason that Madison’s reliance on the precedent of the Articles, as well as the
Antifederalist insistence that the equivalent of Article II be placed in the Constitution, is so
understandable, is precisely because Article II’s requirement that all not “expressly delegated”

state constitutional law–even if there is no text saying so. That conclusion, of course, directly
contradicts the views of state legislative power expressed by both sides of the ratification-era
debate over the omission of a bill of rights. See, e.g., supra note 34 and accompanying text.
41

Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, in 8 RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra
note 20, at 249-53 (Dec. 20, 1787). To Jefferson it was apparent that all is not reserved “in the
case of the general government which is not given,” as demonstrated “by strong inferences from
the body of the instrument, as well as from the omission of the clause of our present
confederation which had declared that in express terms.” Id. at 250.
42

1 RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 20, at 86.

43

Thomas B. McAffee, The Original Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, 90 COLUM. L.
REV. 1215, 1242 (1990) [hereinafter cited as Original Meaning]; AMAR, CREATION AND
RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 13, at 123.
11

would be “retained” by each State appeared as a perfectly plausible way to ensure the protection
of rights. 44 What is important to grasp, however, is that Article II secured rights not by setting
forth affirmative limits on delegated powers – what the Federalists referred to as “exceptions” to
granted powers and modern thinkers call “trumps” – but by making clear that the powers held by
the Articles’ continental Congress were to be construed as strictly limited to those that had been
explicitly delegated.45
What is often missed in understanding the ratification-era debate over the omission of a
Bill of Rights is that the Federalist contention that a Bill of Rights was not only not necessary
under an enumerated powers scheme, but would be “absurd and dangerous,” 46 was based on the

44

Even some Antifederalist opponents of ratification of the proposed Constitution freely
acknowledged that if the Constitution contained a provision that guaranteed that “every power,
jurisdiction, and right, which are not given up by it, remain in the states,” there would be no need
for a bill of rights. Samuel Spencer, North Carolina Ratifying Convention (July 29, 1788), in 4
ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 24, at 163, 163. Accord, A Review of the Constitution Proposed
by the Late Convention Held at Philadelphia 1787, by A Federal Republican, in 2 RATIFICATION
OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 20, at 303, 304-06 (stating that Constitution needed either a
bill of rights or a declaration that all not “decreed to Congress” is reserved to states).
45

See, e.g., Kurt T. Lash, The Lost Original Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, 83 Tex. L.
Rev. 331, 356 (2004) [hereinafter cited as Lost Original Meaning] (describing Article II as
having “distinguished the limited enumerated powers of the federal government from the
unenumerated police powers of the states. Thus, all powers and rights not delegated to Congress
were reserved to the people of the several states. The people of the states, in turn, may delegate
those retained powers and rights to their own state government.”).
46

James Iredell, North Carolina Ratifying Convention, in 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra
note 24, at 149. Edmund Randolph argued in Virginia that as to an “ordinary legislature” with
“no limitation to their powers,” a bill of rights might be necessary; but the “best security” in a
compact “is the express enumeration of powers.” 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 24, at 467
(Virginia Ratifying Convention, June 15, 1788). In his most recent major defense of his reading
of the Ninth Amendment, Barnett simply skips any thought that Federalists feared undermining
the structural protection of rights, claiming that the feared danger was simply that “all [the rights]
that were not listed were surrendered,” and that the rights to be protected are “impossible to
12

risk that the setting forth of rights could be understood to reverse the decision that the national
legislature was to be one of enumerated and limited powers47 –a rights-protective structural
scheme. 48 Even an advocate of unenumerated fundamental rights has acknowledged that the
Federalists “feared a Bill of Rights would imply that the federal government was a government
of general powers rather than of limited, enumerated powers.” 49
This is the reason that the Federalist argument was limited to stating the dangers of a bill

enumerate.” Barnett, The Ninth Amendment, supra note 32, at 8.
47

James Wilson asserted that “[a] proposition to adopt a measure that would have
supposed that we were throwing into the general government every power not expressly reserved
to the people would have been spurned at, in that house, with the greatest indignation.” 2
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 20, at 387-88 (James Wilson, Pennsylvania
Ratifying Convention, Nov. 28, 1787). “The idea that an enumeration of rights was superfluous
in a constitution of merely delegated powers was precisely the idea that Madison intended to
express in the Ninth Amendment.” Edward J. Erler, The Ninth Amendment and Contemporary
Jurisprudence, in The Bill of Rights: Original Meaning and Current Understandings 432, 436
(Eugene W. Hickok, Jr., ed. 1990).
48

Madison linked the argument that a Bill of Rights was not necessary to the argument
that it could prove dangerous when he summarized the Federalist defense in presenting his
proposed Bill of Rights to Congress:
It has been said, that in the Federal Government [declarations of rights] are unnecessary,
because the powers are enumerated, and it follows, that all that are not granted by the
Constitution are retained; that the constitution is a bill of powers, the great residuum being the
rights of the people; and, therefore, a bill of rights cannot be so necessary as if the residuum was
thrown into hands of the Government.
James Madison, Speech to the House Explaining His Proposed Amendments and His Notes for
the Amendment Speech, in 1 THE RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE: THE HISTORY AND
MEANING OF THE NINTH AMENDMENT 51, 59 (Randy E. Barnett ed. 1989) [hereinafter RIGHTS
RETAINED].
49

John Choon Yoo, Our Declaratory Ninth Amendment, 42 Emory L.J. 967, 995 (1993).
13

of rights being added to “a government possessed of enumerated powers.” 50 Thus when state
ratifying conventions proposed amendments against interpreting rights (referred to as “clauses
which declare that Congress shall not exercise certain powers”) to “extend the powers of
Congress,” their purpose was to ensure the protection of rights by avoiding an inference of
general legislative powers. 51
Treanor is certainly right that it was almost a coincidence that the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments wound up “next to each other” in the Bill of Rights. 52 At the same time, when he

50

2 Ratification of the Constitution, supra note 20, at 388 (James Wilson, Pennsylvania
Ratifying Convention, Nov. 28, 1787). Wilson argued: “[W]hen general legislative powers are
given, then the people part with their authority, and, on the gentleman's principle of government,
retain nothing. But in a government like the proposed one, there can be no necessity for a bill of
rights. For, on my principle, the people never part with their power.” Id. at 470 (Dec. 4, 1787). It
was the existence of a federal government of enumerated powers that explains Madison’s fear
that “enumerating particular exceptions to the grant of power” would “disparage those which
which were not placed in the enumeration,” and “those rights which were not singled out, were
intended to be assigned into the hands of the general government.” James Madison, Speech to
the House Explaining His Proposed Amendments and His Notes for the Amendment Speech, in
RIGHTS RETAINED. supra note 48, at 51, 60 (emphasis added). Though acknowledging that
Madison’s analysis was that this “is one of the most plausible arguments I have ever heard urged
against the admission of a bill of rights into this system,” Professor Barnett treats Madison’s
statement as though it were an argument against bills of rights in any constitution. See Barnett,
Ninth Amendment, supra note 27, at 9 (emphasis added).
51

See 1 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 840-45
(1971). Virginia’s seventeenth proposed amendment read:
That those clauses which declare that Congress shall not exercise certain powers,
be not interpreted, in any manner whatsoever, to extend the powers of Congress; but that
they be construed either as making exceptions to the specified powers where this shall be
the case, or otherwise, as inserted merely for greater caution.
DOCUMENTARY RECORD, supra note 24, at 21.
52

Treanor, Taking Text too Seriously, supra note 1, at 509. The House Select Committee
that decided to place the proposed amendments in a separate document, and not to insert them
14

asserts that “the Ninth and Tenth Amendments were not understood as a unit and that no one
conceived of them as belonging together,” 53 it appears that he is simply wrong. 54 As Professor
Lash found:
In the end, the Select Committee’s decision to place the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments side by side was prescient. From the moment they were enacted
(indeed, before), the two provisions were cited as expressing twin principles of
federalism: limited and enumerated federal power. Madison linked the two in his
speech as dual guardians of state autonomy, and numerous treatise writers of the
Founding generation did the same. 55
And when Edmund Randolph objected to the “eleventh proposed amendment” (our
Ninth) before the Virginia Assembly, he contended that the amendment should have been
worded more like the “the 1st and 17th amendments proposed by Virginia.” 56 Notice that even

into the Constitution itself as Madison had proposed, also determined to place what became the
Ninth and Tenth Amendments next to each other.
53

Id. at 518.

54

See, e.g., Kurt T. Lash, The Inescapable Federalism of the Ninth Amendment, 93 IOWA
L. REV 801, 844 (2008) [hereinafter cited as Inescapable Federalism] (observing that “Madison
used the Ninth Amendment in defense of state rights and did so in a manner that recapitulates the
entire history of the Amendment, from its roots in the state conventions to its final placement
alongside, and in tandem with, the Tenth Amendment”); id. at 54 (noting that “[t]here are
literally hundreds of cases and commentaries linking the Ninth and Tenth Amendments as twin
guardians of federalism”).
55

Lash, Lost Original Meaning, supra note 45, at 396. In perhaps the earliest
commentary on the Constitution, Professor Tucker treats the Ninth and Tenth Amendments
together, after quoting each verbatim, and concludes that each calls for “every power” to be
“construed strictly” for the benefit of the people and the states. ST. GEORGE TUCKER, View of the
Constitution of the United States, in VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES WITH
SELECTED WRITINGS 245-46 (Clyde N. Wilson ed., 1999) (1803) [hereinafter cited as VIEW OF
THE CONSTITUTION].
56

2 SCHWARTZ, supra note 51, at 1188. Randolph’s argument is excerpted and then
carefully analyzed at McAffee, Original Meaning, supra note 43, at 1287-1293. The Virginia
15

these amendments were widely separated, as were Madison’s proposed Ninth and Tenth
Amendments before Congress, but Randolph’s argument makes clear that they were closely
related in the minds of the framers. 57 The closeness of that relationship is confirmed as well,
quite strongly, by the amendment proposed by the New York Ratifying Convention, on July 26,
1788.
That the Powers of Government may be reassumed by the People, whensoever it
shall become necessary to their Happiness; that every Power, Jurisdiction and
right, which is not by the said Constitution clearly delegated to the Congress of
the United States, or the departments of the Government thereof, remains to the
People of the several States, or to their respective State Governments to whom
they may have granted the same; and that those Clauses in the said Constitution,
which declare, that Congress shall not have or exercise certain Powers, do not
imply that Congress is entitled to any Powers not given by the said Constitution;
but such Clauses are to be construed either as exceptions to certain specified
Powers, or as inserted merely for the greater caution. 58
proposed amendments present the functional equivalents of the Ninth and Tenth Amendments.
Treanor would be wise to consider why Barnett interprets the Ninth Amendment both to secure
individual rights and to justify “a narrow construction of the powers of the national government.”
Treanor, Taking Text too Seriously, supra note 1, at 509. Barnett’s advocacy of “narrow
construction” of federal powers, to the end of protecting retained rights, implicitly admits that
“rights” and “powers” are closely related and that a “federalism” reading of the Ninth
Amendment has much to offer. Cf. Barnett, Ninth Amendment, supra note 32, at 17-21
(endorsing a “federalism model,” not as a matter of “original meaning,” but as a valid
“constitutional construction” that creates a presumption in favor of retained rights). But cf. infra
note 68 and accompanying text (Barnett separating Ninth and Tenth Amendments as about
“rights” and “powers”).
57

In a thorough analysis of the Virginia debate, including Madison’s correspondence with
Hardin Burnley and George Washington, I observed that both Burnley, a member of the Virginia
assembly who described the assembly debate to Madison, and James Madison, agreed with
Randolph that the Virginia proposed amendment that became the Ninth Amendment was drafted
as a “reservation against constructive power.” McAffee, Original Meaning, supra note 43, at
1287-1293, 1288. A useful treatment of the Virginia debate is found in Lash, Lost Original
Meaning, supra note 45, at 371-78.
58

DOCUMENTARY RECORD, supra note 24, at 21-22. Amar clearly grasped the relevance
of this connection. AMAR, CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 13, at 122. See also
16

The relatedness of the First and Seventeenth proposed amendments of the Virginia
ratifying convention coincides as well with Madison’s statement that he could support a bill of
rights “provided it be so framed as not to imply powers not meant to be included in the
enumeration.” 59 It is also shown by their placement in the Virginia ratifying convention’s
proposed amendments. Both of these amendments were not part of the Virginia convention’s
proposed bill of rights. One set of amendments, the convention stated, was to “be a declaration
or bill of rights asserting, and securing from encroachment, the essential and unalienable rights
of the people.” 60 The First and Seventeenth proposed amendments were part of a separate
section of Virginia’s proposed amendments, denominated AMENDMENTS TO THE BODY OF THE
CONSTITUTION. 61 Virginia’s First proposed amendment was worded very similarly to Article II

MCAFFEE, BYBEE, & BRYANT, POWERS RESERVED, supra note 37, at 36 n. 64 (New York
proposal “confirms that the purpose of the Ninth Amendment . . . was to protect the enumerated
powers scheme and to lend support to what became the Tenth Amendment”); Lash, Lost
Original Meaning, supra note 45, at 355-56. Unsurprisingly, James Wilson had actually labeled
a bill of rights as “an enumeration of the powers reserved.” James Wilson, 2 RATIFICATION OF
THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 20, at 387, 388 (Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention, Nov. 28,
1787). A suggested dichotomy between “rights” and “powers” provisions – as assertedly
embodied in the Ninth and Tenth Amendments – seems repudiated by Wilson’s formulation. For
additional strong evidence that the proposed amendment’s reference to avoiding enlarged powers
related directly to the debate over the dangers of adding a bill of rights, see Lash, Inescapable
Federalism, supra note 54, at 817-23.
59

James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, in 1 SCHWARTZ, supra note 51, at 614, 615 (Oct.
17, 1788).
60

DOCUMENTARY RECORD, supra note 24, at 17.

61

Id. at 19-21. In another source these amendments are described as AMENDMENTS TO
THE CONSTITUTION. 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 24, at 659. Cf. Jon Kukla, “Yes! No! And If
. . . Federalists, Antifederalists, and Virginia’s “Federalists Who are for Amendments,” in
ANTIFEDERALISM: THE LEGACY OF GEORGE MASON 43, 59 (Josephine F. Pacheco ed., 1992)
17

of the Articles of Confederation, retaining “every power, jurisdiction, and right,” not “delegated
to the Congress;” it eventually became the Tenth Amendment.62 Virginia’s Seventeenth
proposed amendment forbad construing limits on powers as extending the powers of Congress,
holding that they should be construed as “making exceptions for the specified powers” or as
“inserted merely for the greater caution.” 63
When Madison offered proposed amendments to the Constitution in the House of
Representatives, moreover, he included all three types of proposals – (1) one inspired by the
Virginia Bill of Rights, sections 1 and 3, to be inserted in the preamble as a “prefix” to the
Constitution 64 ; (2) one seeking to prevent an inference of “enlarged” powers or diminished

[hereinafter cited as ANTIFEDERALISM] (contrasting “a bill of rights and twenty structural
changes”).
62

DOCUMENTARY RECORD, supra note 24, at 19.

63

DOCUMENTARY RECORD, supra note 24, at 21. It is also true, of course, that Virginia’s
seventeenth proposed amendment was responsive to Federalist arguments about the “danger,” or
“absurdity,” of including a bill of rights in the Constitution; so it is unsurprising that Madison
included this proposed amendment – described as a “reservation against constructive power,”
see text accompanying note 104 infra – in Article I, section 9. Virginia’s proposed amendment
grew out of Hamilton’s objection, based on perceived dangers, to including a bill of rights. See
ALEXANDER HAMILTON, THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 579 (JACOB COOKE ED., 1961). The Ninth
Amendment is widely traced both to Hamilton’s argument and to Virginia’s proposed
amendment. McAffee, The Court Over the Constitution, supra note 33, at 1516-1519.
Professor Barnett, however, would trace Hamilton’s argument exclusively to the Tenth
Amendment. Id. at 1517-18.
64

James Madison, Speech to the House Explaining His Proposed Amendments and His
Notes for the Amendment Speech, in 1 RIGHTS RETAINED, supra note 48, at 51, 54. For the
prefix’s proposed content, see infra note 165 and accompanying text. Cf. Va. Const. Of 1776,
Bill of Rights, §§ 1, 3, reprinted in 7 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS: COLONIAL
CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES NOW OR
HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 3812, 3813 (Francis Newton Thorpe
ed., 1909) [hereinafter cited as STATE CONSTITUTIONS]. Amar links the emphasis on the people’s
18

rights, to be in article I, section 9 65 ; and (3) one seeking the inclusion of the functional equivalent
of the Tenth Amendment, to be inserted at Article VI of the Constitution.66 The proximity of
the language of Virginia’s state proposals to the texts we know as the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments is simply undeniable. 67
IV.
Rights and Powers
It is a common objection that if one construes the rights secured by the Ninth
Amendment as referring to the rights defined by the enumerated powers scheme, such an
interpretation “erroneously construes the Ninth Amendment to mean nothing more than what is
stated in the Tenth.” 68 The Tenth Amendment states “that powers not delegated are reserved.” 69
If the “rights” are defined by reference to what’s left over after you explicate the “powers,” the
Ninth Amendment adds nothing. Moreover, the “Tenth Amendment does not speak of rights, . .

right to alter and abolish with analysis by Hamilton in The Federalist No. 78. See AMAR,
CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 13, at 122.
65

James Madison, Speech to the House Explaining His Proposed Amendments and His
Notes for the Amendment Speech, in 1 RIGHTS RETAINED, supra note 48, at 51, 55.
66

Id. at 56.

67

For a close comparison, see Lash, Inescapable Federalism, supra note 54, at 822-23.
Lash notes that some contend that the language referencing powers “was moved to the Tenth
Amendment,” but correctly concludes that “this clearly is not the case.” Id. at 823. “The powers
to which Madison refers in his initial draft of the Ninth involved only the implied enlargement of
enumerated powers. This language was not moved to the Tenth; it simply disappeared.” Id.
68

Randy E. Barnett, Reconceiving the Ninth Amendment, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 6
(1988) [hereinafter cited as Reconceiving]. “By contrast,” Barnett observes, “the Ninth
Amendment speaks only of rights, not of powers.” Id.
69

Id.
19

. but of reserved ‘powers,’” 70 and such an interpretation of the Ninth therefore directly violates
Justice Marshall’s famous dictum that “[i]t cannot be presumed that any clause in the
constitution is intended to be without effect; and, therefore, such a construction is inadmissible,
unless the words require it.”71 The traditional reading of the Ninth Amendment, on this view,
posits that the amendment was “confusingly written in terms of ‘rights’ that are ‘retained by the
people,’ to express exactly the same idea”72 stated in the Tenth Amendment. The result is that
this conception “renders the Ninth Amendment effectively inapplicable to any conceivable case
or controversy.” 73
Prior to addressing the objection directly, it is at least relevant, and worthy of comment,
that Professor Barnett, who makes much of this redundancy objection, has adopted an
interpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause that is at least as redundant of his own
construction of the Ninth Amendment as the traditional interpretation of the Ninth Amendment is
of the Tenth. At least since the early 1990's, Professor Barnett has embraced the view that it is
“improper,” and therefore a violation of the power recognized in the Necessary and Proper
Clause, for Congress to enact legislation that violated the “background rights” of the people. 74

70

Id.

71

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803). Justice Marshall’s wellknown dictum is used as a heading at the very beginning of Barnett’s first important treatment of
the Ninth Amendment. Barnett, Reconceiving, supra note 68, at 1.
72

Barnett, Reconceiving, supra note 68, at 6.

73

Id.

74

Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause, 6 U. Pa.
J. Const. L. 183, 217 (2003) [hereinafter cited as Necessary and Proper Clause]. Barnett fully
20

More recently, Barnett has endorsed the idea that whatever rights are “retained” by the principle
articulated in the Ninth Amendment, any law that “improperly” intruded on such a right would
be a direct violation of the Necessary and Proper Clause. 75 If Barnett’s interpretation of the
Necessary and Proper Clause is correct, it is not even clear why it was not prominently featured
in the debate over the omission of a Bill of Rights; and, if it is correct, the Ninth Amendment
clearly has no independent role to play in constitutional adjudication, since all the same rights are
already secured by the Necessary and Proper Clause.
More generally, if the redundancy objection has any merit, it did not impact the
committee that drafted the Virginia ratifying convention’s first and seventeenth proposed
amendments, as both were rules of construction that referred to both rights and powers.
Virginia’s first proposed amendment, tracking the Confederation’s Article II, stated that each
state retained “every power, jurisdiction, and right,” not “delegated to the Congress.” 76 It’s
seventeenth proposed amendment prohibited misconstruing rights limitations on federal powers

accepted the relatively stringent – and “rights-protective” – construction of the Necessary and
Proper Clause found in Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The “Proper” Scope of Federal
Power: A Jurisdictional Reading of the Sweeping Clause, 43 Duke L.J. 267 (1993) [hereinafter
cited as The Sweeping Clause].
75

Barnett, Necessary and Proper Clause, supra note 74, at 217-19. Barnett attempted for
a period to reconcile his strict reading of the Necessary and Proper Clause with his stated view
that the rights “retained” by the Ninth Amendment are the natural rights people bring with them
from the state of nature when they join the social contract; but his sporadically stated view that
the people also “retain” fundamental positive rights has managed to “win out,” though to date
without anything offered by way of justification. See MCAFFEE, BYBEE, & BRYANT, POWERS
RESERVED, supra note 37, at 62 n. 150
76

DOCUMENTARY RECORD, supra note 24, at 19 (emphasis added).
21

as extending or enlarging the powers granted to Congress.77 The reason thoughtful people could
think them both essential is that both provisions are cautionary guarantees to assure that the
limited powers design of the Constitution was understood and implemented. 78
Professor Lash concluded that Madison based his draft of the Bill of Rights “on the
concerns emanating from the state ratifying conventions,” and that the state proposed
amendments show “how those who ratified the Constitutions understood and used terms like
‘powers’ and ‘rights.’” 79 As the various state proposals indicated, the Ninth and Tenth
amendments have separate histories and serve complementary functions. 80 The Tenth
Amendment grew out of expressed fears that the omission of such an explicit guarantee of

77

The full text of Virginia’s seventeenth proposed amendment is found at note 48 supra.
It is clear that clauses “which declare that Congress shall not exercise certain powers” is a
reference to “rights” provisions, and they work as “exceptions” to powers whenever they operate
to trump the exercise of granted powers. When Professor Barnett contends that there is nothing
in this proposal “about the rights of the people, collective or otherwise,” but instead relates
exclusively to the “rights of states” – and is therefore unrelated to “the problem for which the
Ninth Amendment was Madison’s solution” – it becomes clear that he simply does not
understand how Virginia’s proposed amendments related to the debate over the omission of a bill
of rights. Randy E. Barnett, Lash’s Majoritarian Difficulty: A Response to A Textual-Historical
Theory of the Ninth Amendment, 60 Stanf. L. Rev. 937, 950 (2008).
78

Amar is clearly right in asserting that the “obvious counterargument–chanted like a
mantra by most mainstream scholars–is that this reading renders the Ninth Amendment wholly
redundant of the Tenth. But this obvious counterargument is obviously wrong, and no amount of
chanting can save it.” AMAR, CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 13, at 123.
79

Lash, Lost Original Meaning, supra note 45, at 355.

80

Their complementary functions explain why Professor Lash has observed that “every
court and every scholar who addressed the Ninth Amendment in the first period of constitutional
law read the Ninth in pari materia with the Tenth as one of the twin guardians of federalism.”
Kurt T. Lash, The Lost Jurisprudence of the Ninth Amendment, 83 Tex. L. Rev. 597, 643 (2005)
[hereinafter cited as The Lost Jurisprudence].
22

reserved powers, such as had been included in the Articles of Confederation, might raise the
inference that general powers were intended. 81 The Ninth Amendment, on the other hand,
addresses the altogether different threat posed by the enumeration of specific limitations on
government powers designed to secure individual rights. The Tenth Amendment does not by its
terms address any inferences which arguably flow from the enumeration of rights in the
Constitution. Moreover, constitutional law scholars have in recent years underscored that the
“anti-redundancy” presumption should be formulated as an “anti-nullity” presumption, 82
recognizing that “redundancy in legal documents is not particularly odd,” especially when “the
drafting history of the Bill of Rights explains the presence of both provisions.” 83
Nor is it correct that under its traditional interpretation the Ninth Amendment “is
rendered irrelevant to any conceivable constitutional decision” and thus lacks “any potential
application.” 84 If the government contended in a particular case that it held a general power to
regulate the press as an appropriate inference from the First Amendment restriction on that
power, or argued that it possessed a general police power by virtue of the existence of the bill of
rights, the Ninth Amendment would provide a direct refutation.

Indeed, the Federalist

predictions in fact occurred, as there are examples early in the nation’s history of arguments for
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McAffee, Original Meaning, supra note 43, at 1307.

82

Akhil Reed , Constitutional Redundancies and Clarifying Clauses, 33 VAL. U. L. REV.
1, 3 (1998).
83

Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication:
Three Objections and Responses, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 226, 271 (1988).
84

Barnett, Reconceiving, supra note 68, at 6.
23

enlarged federal powers being based on the explicit statements of limitations found in the federal
Bill of Rights. 85
It is significant, moreover, that one who opposes reading the Ninth Amendment as an
attempt to secure the rights protected by the enumerated powers scheme, and who contends that
the Tenth Amendment is about “powers” while the Ninth Amendment is about “rights,”
nevertheless winds up employing a strict construction of federal powers as a central feature of
efforts to implement that Ninth Amendment. During the debate over a bill of rights, one
Federalist argued that the limited delegation of powers in article I “amounts in fact to a bill of
rights.” 86 If the linchpin of this argument was the assumption that implied rights limitations
would be read into the powers, this would be a peculiar argument, inasmuch as the limited
delegation of powers as such would add nothing to the security given the rights. This would be
even more puzzling when one considers how often the Federalists contended that their point was
made by examining the text of the Constitution itself. Thus James Wilson asked: “[W]hat part of

85

See, e.g., MCAFFEE, BYBEE, & BRYANT, POWERS RESERVED, supra note 37, at 76-78
(reviewing reliance on First Amendment to justify criminalizing seditious libel in the Sedition
Act); id. at 231 (concluding that “the concern that gave rise to the Ninth Amendment was not
some kind of farfetched claim is illustrated by the actual historical inference of national power”
based on “the adoption of a federal Bill of Rights”); AMAR, CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION,
supra note 13, at 124; Kurt T. Lash, “Tucker’s Rule”: St. George Tucker and the Limited
Construction of Federal Power, 47 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1343, 1376 (2006) [hereinafter cited as
St. George Tucker] (Marshall used Federalist argument based on rights limitations in justifying
the national bank in McCulloch); Forrest McDonald, The Bill of Rights: Unnecessary and
Pernicious, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS: GOVERNMENT PROSCRIBED 387, 398-400 (Ronald Hoffman
& Peter J. Alberts eds., 1997) [hereinafter cited as GOVERNMENT PROSCRIBED].
86

2 RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 20, at 411, 412 (Thomas McKean,
Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention, Nov. 28, 1787).
24

this system puts it in the power of Congress to attack [the rights of conscience]?” 87 Edmund
Randolph inquired: “Where is the page where [freedom of the press] is restrained? . . . . I again
ask for the particular clause which gives liberty to destroy the freedom of the press.” 88 The
argument is that a simple examination of the text would convey what modern commentators
insist is the consequence of an implied limitation based on inherent and natural rights.
On such a view, James Wilson could not logically have made the argument that if
Congress had been granted the power “to regulate literary publications,” a liberty of the press
provision would have been essential. 89 If implied limitations would be read in to the powers
granted, a power “to regulate literary publications” would be interpreted as permitting only
regulations that did not abridge the preexisting right to a free press. Wilson’s argument reflects
that the parties to the debate over a bill of rights agreed that even inalienable natural rights
(which freedom of the press was in most minds) were not automatically “retained” as to

87

2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 24, at 455 (Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention, Dec.

4, 1787).
88

3 id. at 469 (Gov. Edmund Randolph, Virginia Ratifying Convention, June 15, 1788).

89

2 RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 20, 168 (Oct. 6, 1787). From Roger
Sherman's convention argument that a provision for freedom of the press was “unnecessary”
because “[t]he power of Congress does not extend to the Press,” 2 THE RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION of 1787, at 618 (MAX FARRAND ED., 1911) [hereinafter cited as
FARRAND], to Hamilton's argument in The Federalist No. 84 that inclusion of a provision
guaranteeing a free press would imply a power to regulate the press that was not given, the
Federalist argument was that the nature and scope of the actual grants of power were the
protections afforded the people's rights by the proposed Constitution. See, e.g., Plain Truth:
Reply to an Officer of the Late Continental Army, in 2 RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION,
supra note 20 at 219 (Nov. 10, 1787) (as Congress “can only have the defined powers given, it
was needless to say anything about liberty of the press, liberty of conscience, or any other liberty
that a freeman ought never to be deprived of”).
25

governments of general legislative powers–or, as Wilson’s specific argument suggests, if the
powers granted are sufficiently broad as to fairly be read as enabling government to threaten
such a natural right. 90 Wilson’s contention reflects that he took quite seriously the idea that the
people’s authority was “absolute, supreme, and uncontrollable.” 91 Contrast Wilson’s reliance on
the people’s authority in establishing the Constitution with Professor Barnett’s characterization
of the idea that the Constitution is based on the “consent of the governed” as nothing more than
an elaborate fiction. 92

90

Wilson is a somewhat perplexing figure, in that he was, at the same time, an advocate
of “a fairly expansive conception of the scope of liberty protected by natural law,” MARK DAVID
HALL, THE POLITICAL AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHY OF JAMES WILSON 1742-1798, at 54 (1997), and
yet displayed little “recognition of the problem of reconciling civil liberties with the principle of
popular sovereignty.” JAMES H. READ, POWER VERSUS LIBERTY: MADISON, HAMILTON, WILSON,
AND JEFFERSON 113 (2000). See McAffee, The Court Over the Constitution, supra note 33, at
1585-1587.
91

James Wilson, in 2 RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 20, at 348
(Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention, Nov. 24, 1787). To Wilson it was clear that popular
sovereignty “is a power paramount to every constitution, inalienable in its nature, and indefinite
in its extent.” Id. at 349. Accord, TUCKER, Of the Several Forms of Government, in VIEW OF
THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 55, at 23 (people’s power is “unlimitable,” as well as “supreme,
irresistible, absolute, uncontrollable,” and is “inherent” and “unalienable from them”). Indeed,
Wilson would have agreed that “the signature right of the Founding era–the right of selfgovernment–is best understood as a collective right rather than an individual right.” Richard
Primus, An Introduction to the Nature of American Rights, in THE NATURE OF RIGHTS AT THE
AMERICAN FOUNDING AND BEYOND (BARRY ALAN SHAIN ED. 2007) [hereinafter cited as THE
NATURE OF RIGHTS].
92

See, e.g,, RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION
(2004) [hereinafter cited as RESTORING] (chapter entitled “The Fiction of ‘We
the People’: Is the Constitution Binding on Us?”). But see McAffee, The Court Over the
Constitution, supra note 33, at 1565-1589; Lash, Inescapable Federalism, supra note 54, at 813;
Stephen M. Griffin, Barnett and the Constitution We Have Lost, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 283, 28789 (2005). Given his arguments against popular sovereignty, it is difficult to determine why –
or even how -- Barnett endorses the popular right to “alter or abolish” the form of government a
people live under. See infra note 293 and accompanying text.
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Contrast Wilson’s clear statement with Professor Barnett’s insistence that Madison held
the view that “Congress would have no power to infringe upon the rights of freedom of the press
or of conscience whether or not these rights had been enumerated.” 93 On this view, even a clear
grant of power to regulate literary publications would not generate any need for a limiting
provision inasmuch as the unstated right would already be “retained.” 94

Madison’s actual

argument is as follows:
The defense against the charge founded on the want of a bill of rights presupposed, he said, that the powers not given were retained; and that those given
were not to be extended by remote implications. On any other supposition, the
power of Congress to abridge the freedom of the press, or the rights of
conscience, &c., could not have been disproved. 95
Notice that at the center of the argument is our long-encountered proposition that “the powers
not given were retained.” Barnett, however, reads the injunction that the powers are “not to be
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Randy E. Barnett, Necessary and Proper, 44 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 745, 781 (1997). Cf.
David N. Mayer, The Natural Rights Basis of the Ninth Amendment: A Reply to Professor
McAffee, 16 S. Ill. U.L.J 313, 322-23 (1992) (acknowledging that Wilson and other federalists
contended that in the states the people gave government every right and authority not explicitly
reserved, and thus justified reliance on the enumerated powers scheme – but still doubting that
they “meant to contradict natural rights theory”).
94

Barnett’s view rests in part on the assumption that rights are “retained” whether they are
positively “enumerated” or not. One does not even require a Ninth Amendment for such rights–
enumerated or not–to be “retained.” Indeed, a “prior” source of constitutional protection, we
learn, is that an act of legislation is “improper” under the Necessary and Proper Clause if it
violates “the background rights retained by the people.” BARNETT, RESTORING, supra note 92, at
186, citing Lawson & Granger, The Sweeping Clause, supra note 74, at 297. Compare Lawson &
Granger, The Sweeping Clause, supra note 74, at 318–19 (laws violating freedom of the press
“improper” under the Necessary and Proper Clause) with Randy E. Barnett, Necessary and
Proper, 44 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 745, 781 (1997) (construing Madison’s assurances that a free press
is not threatened by powers granted, based partly on idea that powers should not be “extended by
remote implications,” as based on a theory of “unenumerated rights”).
95

2 Annals of the Congress of the United States 1901 (Feb. 2, 1791) (Joseph Gales ed.,

1834).
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extended by remote implications” as “a restrictive interpretation of necessity” that reflects that
strict construction of federal powers in effect was the means for avoiding an inadequate
protection of unenumerated fundamental rights.
Wilson’s argument that the power “to regulate literary publications” would necessitate a
free press clause need not, however, be read as contradicting Madison’s claim that “the powers
not given were retained.” Madison’s argument does not really appear to be one demanding
strict construction; it simply urges against such liberal construction that granted powers are
“extended by remote implications.” As a participant in the debate in which the Constitution’s
defenders contended that Congress’s few and defined powers would function as a veritable bill
of rights, Madison was urging a careful construction of granted powers, not one that invariably
construed the Constitution–no matter what its words said–consistently with unenumerated
“retained rights.”
And when James Iredell contended that an adequate “boundary” to prevent violation of
rights has been provided and that “any person by inspecting [the Constitution] may see if the
power claimed be enumerated,” 96 the argument becomes quixotic if it really amounts to saying
that implied limitations, not really conveyed by the text itself, actually supply the only
“boundaries” to government power. Thus Professor Hamburger could reasonably conclude that
the Federalists believed that the precise “enumeration of federal powers provided a clear
boundary between federal power and the people’s rights.” 97 Looking back in 1820 at the
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4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 24, at 171 (June 29, 1788).

97

Philip A. Hamburger, The Constitution’s Accommodation of Social Change, 88 MICH.
L.. REV. 239, 315-16 (1989).
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ratification-era debate over the omission of a bill of rights, and the subsequent adoption of the
Ninth Amendment, John Taylor contended that the amendment enjoined “that the enumeration of
certain rights shall not be construed to disparage those retained though not specified, by not
having been parted with.” 98
In presenting his draft of the Bill of Rights to Congress, Madison acknowledged that the
granted powers included power “with respect to means, which may admit of abuse to a certain
extent, in the same manner as the powers of the state governments under their constitutions may
to an indefinite extent.” 99 Congress’s power to collect revenues would enable it to enact a law
permitting the issuing of general search warrants as a means of enforcing its revenue laws.100
Madison’s premise was that Congress’s powers should be understood by a natural construction
of the language conveying power, together with the Necessary and Proper Clause – with no
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JOHN TAYLOR, CONSTRUCTIONS CONSTRUED AND CONSTITUTIONS VINDICATED 49 (De
Capo Press 1970) (1820) (emphasis added). See id. at 48. (suggesting that “different modes are
pursued,” in that both “certain specified aggressions are forbidden,” and “all the rights and
powers not delegated are reserved”); TUCKER, View of the Constitution of the United States, in
VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 55, at 121 (asserting that under Constitution each state
was “retaining an entire liberty of exercising, as it thinks proper, all those parts of its
sovereignty, which are not mentioned in the constitution, or act of union, as parts that ought to be
exercised in common”). See Lash, Lost Original Meaning, supra note 45, at 414. n. 409.
99

DOCUMENTARY RECORD, supra note 24, at 82. Madison directly compared the
discretion to Congress granted by the Necessary and Proper Clause, with the discretion of state
legislatures to enact “improper laws” in “fulfilling the more extended objects of those
governments.” Id.
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Id. at 82-83. Madison’s frank acknowledgment is quite consistent with the conclusion
of a modern commentator that “[a]n examination of the arguments for and against the need for a
bill of rights shows the Antifederalists to have the stronger argument.” Murray Dry, The
Antifederalists and the Constitution, in ANTIFEDERALISM: THE LEGACY OF GEORGE MASON 25,
38 (Josephine F. Pacheco ed., 1992) [hereinafter cited as ANTIFEDERALISM]. But notice how
contrary this conclusion is to the view that the nation could have proceeded based on natural
rights that were nowhere enumerated. See infra note 139 and accompanying text.
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presumption against government power imported in – and this necessitated the insertion of the
Fourth Amendment. 101
Despite his genuine concerns about the potential impact of the Necessary and Proper
Clause, Madison continued to believe that the enumerated powers scheme would be a powerful
means to secure important rights. This view was demonstrated reflected in his response to
criticisms that emerged when Congress adopted the language of “retained” rights rather than
adopting the language proposed by Virginia prohibiting an inference of enlarged powers from
prohibitions on the exercise of powers in the Constitution.102 Edmund Randolph had objected to
the reference to “retained rights,” contending that it purported to protect rights, but the rights
were “reducable [sic] to no definitive certainty.”103 He thus advocated that this “reservation
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At one time, Professor Barnett fully acknowledged that Madison’s argument reflected
a recognition that the Necessary and Proper Clause showed the need for a bill of rights. Barnett,
Reconceiving, supra note 68, at 14. Despite insisting that the Ninth Amendment secured natural
liberty rights, and having freely acknowledged that the Fourth Amendment presented an example
of a “positive right,” Barnett eventually changed his mind and concluded that both the Ninth
Amendment and the Necessary and Proper Clause precluded the use of general search warrants.
MCAFFEE, BYBEE, & BRYANT, POWERS RESERVED, supra note 37, at 62 n. 150; McAffee, The
Court Over the Constitution, supra note 33, at 1549-50.
102

The original Virginia Ratifying Convention proposed an amendment that forbad
construing rights limitations “to extend the powers of Congress.” DOCUMENTARY RECORD,
supra note 24, at 21. For the full text, see supra note 51. Madison’s proposal read as follows:
The exceptions here or elsewhere in the Constitution, made in favor of particular
rights, shall not be so construed as to diminish the just importance of other rights retained by the
people, or as to enlarge the powers delegated by the constitution; but either as actual limitations
of such powers, or as inserted merely for the greater caution.
1 Annals of Cong., supra note 21, at col. 452.
103

Letter from Hardin Burnley to James Madison, in 1 SCHWARTZ, supra note 51, at 1188.
Burnley was a member of the Virginia assembly. Professor Barnett takes Burnley and Madison
as seeking a single end, of securing personal rights, and thus concludes that any concerns about
30

against constructive power” should conform to the pattern established by the first and
seventeenth amendments proposed by Virginia.”104 Madison, agreeing completely with
Assemblyman Burnley, thought the distinction between not “extending” powers and retaining
rights was “fanciful,” because if you can draw a line “between the powers granted and the rights
retained,” it doesn’t matter whether you state the amendment in terms of rights or powers. 105

“power” were folded in to the Tenth Amendment. See Randy E. Barnett, James Madison’s Ninth
Amendment, in 1 RIGHTS RETAINED, supra note 48, at 1, 13 (Randy E. Barnett ed. 1989) (“The
danger of interpreting federal powers too expansively was handled by the Tenth Amendment,
while the danger of jeopardizing unenumerated rights was addressed by the Ninth
Amendment.”). If this were so, the question raised is how he manages to interpret the Ninth
Amendment as both securing rights and as justifying “a narrow construction of the powers of the
national government.” Treanor, Taking Text too Seriously, supra note 1, at 509.
104

Id. In his letter to Madison, Burnley stated that he did not see “the force of the
distinction, for by preventing an extension of power . . . safety will be insured if its [Congress’s]
powers are not too extensive already.” Id. “Thus Burnley was confident that the people’s
rights would be adequately protected by the proposed amendment, provided the Convention had
adequately defined federal powers in the first place.” MCAFFEE, BYBEE, & BRYANT, POWERS
RESERVED, supra note 37, at 37. For a review of this correspondence, concluding that it lends
strong support to a “federalism” interpretation of the Ninth Amendment, see Lash, Inescapable
Federalism, supra note 54, at 836-44; id. at 838 n. 130 (noting that Professor Barnett rejects
Madison’s distinction “as out of sync with modern understanding of personal rights,” but
concluding that Madison “had a different point of view”). But see Barnett, The Ninth
Amendment, supra note 32, at 55 (contending that “Burnley himself clearly distinguishes
between ‘the people’ and ‘the states’ and the actual words of the Ninth Amendment refer only to
the former”). Barnett’s characterization of Burnley’s words confirms that he simply does not
understand Burnley’s argument. For additional confirming evidence, see Barnett, Reconceiving,
supra note 68, at 16.
105

Id. at 1189, 1190 (letter from Madison to President Washington, Dec. 5, 1789).
Notice that both defenses of the final wording required the use of a hypothetical assumption that
federal powers had been adequately defined so that the rights were “adequately protected” and
one could draw the line between granted powers and protected rights. For a more complete
analysis of the correspondence regarding the debate in the Virginia assembly, see McAffee,
Original Meaning, supra note 43, at 1287-1293. See also Lash, Inescapable Federalism, supra
note 54, at 836-44; id. 839-40 (concluding that both Burnley and Madison “believed that
Randolph had wrongly criticized the Ninth Amendment as inadequately ‘federalist,” and that
“the retained rights of the people would necessarily constrain federal power and adequately
31

Madison believed that, if the framers had drafted the grants of powers as carefully as they
should have – and that he thought they had – drawing a distinction between the final version of
the amendment and the one that Virginia had initially proposed, made no sense at all (or was
“fanciful,” as he put it). Madison confirmed absolutely the views expressed by Hardin Burnley,
who could not see “the force of the distinction,” for the same reason–namely, if its framers had
succeeded in ensuring that Congress’s powers were “not too extensive already,” by the drafting
of a set of meaningfully limited powers, prohibiting an inference of enlarged powers would mean
exactly the same thing as preserving the people’s “retained” rights. Professor Lash observes that
Madison was in effect confirming the close connection between the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments:
Although the final version of the Ninth Amendment spoke only of the retained
rights of the people, Madison insisted that preserving retained rights and
constraining federal power amounted to the same thing and that the final version
continued to express the same federalist principle demanded by the state
conventions. This is how Madison described the Ninth Amendment in a major
speech while the Amendment was under consideration, and this is how every
scholar and court read the Ninth Amendment for the next one-hundred years. 106
It has become common to assert that the fundamental, unenumerated rights construction
of the Ninth Amendment receives strong support from the amendment’s reference to rights, not
powers, that are “retained” by the people. For example, it has been contended that “under social

protect the retained rights of the people and the states”). Even though it is true that neither of the
state proposals, nor the final version of the Ninth Amendment, were designed to supply “an
explicit protection of the rights of states,” Barnett The Ninth Amendment, supra note 27, at 54
(emphasis added), each was designed to protect what had been “retained” by the sovereign
people – state by state -- when granting powers to the nation.
106

Lash, Inescapable Federalism, supra note 54, at 808. Lash also observes that,
although the other states were fully aware that Madison’s original proposal “expressly limited
federal power,” no other state objected to the language change. Id. at 843.
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contract theory,” this phrase refers to “natural rights ‘retained’ during the transition from the
state of nature to civil society.” 107 The very fact that the amendment refers to retained rights is
taken as referencing liberty rights that the people “retain” when they leave the state of nature and
join the social contract.
Thus Professor Barnett emphasizes two considerations: first, Madison used the word
“retain” in referring to natural rights the people keep “when particular powers are given up to be
exercised by the Legislature.” 108 Secondly, Roger Sherman used the word “retained” when
proposing a rough equivalent of Section 1 of the Virginia Bill of Rights to the committee charged
with fashioning a completed version of the amendments proposed for the Constitution. 109
But the words “retained” and “reserved” were used pervasively in the ratification-era debate over
the omission of a Bill of Rights, and generally referred to what the sovereign people – referring
to either “the people” considered as a collective whole or to “the people” making the ratification
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Jeff Rosen, Note, Was the Flag Burning Amendment Unconstitutional?, 100 YALE L.J.
1073, 1075 (1991) [hereinafter cited as Flag Burning Amendment].
108

BARNETT, RESTORING, supra note 92, at 54, citing, 1 The Debates and Proceedings in
the Congress of the United States 454 (Gales & Seaton eds., 1834). For a different analysis of
the drafting process and its relationship to the Ninth Amendment, see McAffee, Social Contract
Theory, supra note 74, at 296-305.
109

BARNETT, RESTORING, supra note 92, at 238, 243. For a different perspective on
Sherman’s role in bringing us the Bill of Rights, including treatment of Sherman’s proposed
language anticipating both the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, see McAffee, The Court Over the
Constitution, supra note 33, at 1556-1561. Accord, Lash, Inescapable Federalism, supra note 54,
at 29 n. 102 (noting that although Barnett at one time “appeared to claim that Sherman’s Draft
Bill of Rights” was linked to “retained individual natural rights,” it now appears that he has
“backed away from that claim”); Lash, Lost Original Meaning, supra note 45, at 362-367. That
Madison proposed similar language to be inserted in the Constitution’s preamble, see note 64
and accompanying text, simply confirms that Sherman’s proposed natural rights provision likely
reflected that sections 1 and 3 of the Virginia bill of rights remained significant in the minds of
the founders.
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decision state by state – “kept” when they “granted” or “delegated” powers to the national
government. 110 T he pattern was reflected in the language of Article II of the Articles of
Confederation, which stated that each State would “retain” “every power, jurisdiction, and
right,” not “delegated to the Congress.” 111 It is thus unsurprising that James Wilson went so far
as to assert that “the powers given and reserved form the whole rights of the people.” 112 And
when Madison summarized the ratification debate when presenting his proposed amendments to
Congress, he observed that the Federalists had viewed the Constitution as “a bill of powers, the
great residuum being the rights of the people; and, therefore, a bill of rights cannot be so
necessary as if the residuum was thrown into the hands of the Government.” 113
The lack of significant weight legitimately given to the particular language chosen for the
Ninth Amendment is illustrated by Patrick Henry’s use of the very phrase, “the rights retained by
the people,” in describing the contents of the Virginia bill of rights in the Virginia Ratifying
Convention. 114 It is absolutely clear that Henry did not perceive natural rights as automatically
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The classic example of this usage is in Alexander Hamilton’s Federalist No. 84, where
he contended that “[h]ere, in strictness, the people surrender nothing, and as they retain every
thing, they have no need of particular reservations.” ALEXANDER HAMILTON, THE FEDERALIST
NO. 84, supra note 63, at 578 (emphasis added). He goes on to favorably compare the preamble
as a “recognition of popular rights” to the “aphorisms” that made up state Declarations of Rights.
Id. at 578-79. See infra note 150.
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DOCUMENTARY RECORD, supra note 24, at 19.
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2 RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 20, at 469, 470 (Dec. 4, 1787).
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James Madison, Speech to the House Explaining His Proposed Amendments and His
Notes for the Amendment Speech, in 1 RIGHTS RETAINED, supra note 48, at 51, 59.
114

3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 24, at 448.
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“retained” because they were natural rights or were “inalienable.” 115 That Henry was, instead, a
constitutional positivist is reflected not only in his insistence on the absolute necessity of a bill of
rights, but also in his role in opposing the inclusion of a Bill of Attainder Clause in the Virginia
Bill of Rights and in his promotion, as governor, of the adoption of a bill of attainder during the
American revolution. 116
Though Justice Chase directly contradicts the substance and tenor of the ratification-era
debate over the omission of a Bill of Rights, Professor Barnett takes his invocation of
“unenumerated rights” in Calder v. Bull 117 as stating the precise “original public meaning” of the
federal Ninth Amendment. He takes Justice Iredell as contending before the North Carolina
Ratifying Convention not only that there are “unenumerated rights,” but that “all rights should
remain unenumerated.” 118 After all, Barnett asserts, the Constitution’s framers “shared a
common belief that although the people may delegate certain powers to their agents in
government, they still retain their natural rights.” 119 Indeed, Professor Barnett assures us that
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See infra notes 140-141 and accompanying texts.
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McAffee, Social Contract Theory, supra note 74, at 279-80, 294.
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3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
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Randy E. Barnett, Who’s Afraid of Unenumerated Rights, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 4, 4
(2006) [hereinafter cited as Who’s Afraid]. But it is quite clear that Iredell believed that the
“unenumerated rights” consisted of the rights defined by what had not been “granted” to the
federal government as powers. A close reading of Iredell’s speeches as the North Carolina
Ratifying convention confirms that this is true. See supra note 96 and accompanying text; and
infra notes 191-199 and accompanying texts.
119

Randy E. Barnett, A Ninth Amendment for Today’s Constitution, 26 VALP. U. L. REV.
419, 422 (1991). By contrast, in the modern era, Professor Pound has contended that “[n]atural
rights mean simply interests which we think ought to be secured . . . [and] it is fatal to all sound
thinking to treat them as legal conceptions.” Roscoe Pound, The Rights of Englishmen and Rights
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until the federal Bill of Rights was adopted “two years after the ratification of the Constitution,”
with a handful of “exceptions,” it was clear that “all of the rights retained by the people were
unenumerated.” 120 And yet, he offers reassuringly, “no one argued that the federal government
had the power to abridge or deny . . . unenumerated liberties.” 121
But we have seen that virtually no one engaged in the controversy over the omission of a
bill of rights during the ratification-era debates thought the natural rights were simply “retained,”
as a matter of law, under the state constitutions that existed prior to the ratification of the United
States Constitution. Since the state constitutions conveyed “a general grant of legislative
authority,” it followed that “no rights were immune from such broad state powers and some
explicit reservation would be necessary.” 122 Even the rights sometimes referred to as “inherent”
or “inalienable” – especially if not written down as specific limiting provisions – did not
necessarily function as limits on the general powers of the states’ legislatures; this is why the
state constitutions were universally regarded as requiring Declarations of Rights within their
state constitutions if the powers of government were going to be limited in any fashion. 123

of Man, in THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW, at 85, 92 (1921).
120

Randy E. Barnett, The Proper Scope of the Police Power, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
429, 435 (2004) [hereinafter cited as The Police Power]. See also BARNETT, RESTORING, supra
note 92, at 235-36.
121

Id. By contrast, Professor Barnett contends that the modern tendency to advocate more
restrictive readings of the Ninth Amendment reflects a “modern philosophical skepticism about
rights.” Barnett, Reconceiving, supra note 68, at 3.
122

Richard S. Kay, Book Review, 44 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 430, 431 (2000) (reviewing
INHERENT RIGHTS, THE WRITTEN CONSTITUTION, AND POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY: THE FOUNDERS’
UNDERSTANDING (see infra note 124)).
123

See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying texts. See infra notes 137-162; 171-184 and
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III.
Natural Rights and Constitutional Positivism
It is common for advocates of the fundamental, unenumerated rights construction of the
Ninth Amendment to write as if we are confronting a very strong dichotomy between
“naturalists,” or advocates of natural rights jurisprudence, and “positivists,” those who advocate
constitutional positivism. 124 Those who drafted and ratified the Constitution, and especially
those who accepted and ratified the Bill of Rights, were naturalists. 125

By contrast, modern

thinkers who contend for alternative interpretations of the Ninth Amendment, are often moral
skeptics who are also positivists.126 The prospect that there could be a “moral realist defense of
constitutional democracy,” 127 that reads the Constitution itself as a basically positivist document,

accompanying texts.
124

THOMAS B. MCAFFEE, INHERENT RIGHTS, THE WRITTEN CONSTITUTION, AND POPULAR
SOVEREIGNTY: THE FOUNDERS’ UNDERSTANDING 16 -17 (2000) [hereinafter cited as INHERENT
RIGHTS] (concluding that this presumed dichotomy “obscures the reality that even a legal system
purportedly grounded on natural law norms must confront challenging institutional questions
about implementing those norms in political and legal practice”).
125

For a citation to several sources attributing a natural law jurisprudence – and certainly
not a positivist one – to the founding generation, see Thomas B. McAffee, Prolegomena to a
Meaningful Debate of the “Unwritten Constitution” Thesis, 61 U. CINC. L. REV. 107, 133 n. 83
(1992) [hereinafter Prolegomena].
126

BARNETT, RESTORING, supra note 92, at 242-252 (subsection entitled “The Views of
Ninth Amendment Skeptics”); Randy E. Barnett, Getting Normative: The Role of Natural Rights
in Constitutional Adjudication, 12 CONST. COMM. 93, 96 (1995) [hereinafter cited as Getting
Normative] (contending that “skeptics” have provided “labored textual and historical arguments”
against the unenumerated fundamental rights reading of Ninth Amendment); id. at 111 (if those
who would comply with text are right that the text “does not provide any protection of
unenumerated rights, they may have won the constitutional battle, yet lost the legitimacy war”).
127

Michael W. McConnell, A Moral Realist Defense of Constitutional Democracy, 64
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 89 (1988).
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is dismissed out of hand. The assumption is that the Constitution’s framers were just enough
naturalists that, even the text we call the Ninth Amendment, was in an important sense,
superfluous, given that the Constitution’s framers and ratifiers already believed that the people had
“retained” the rights they held by nature at the time they joined the social contract we call the
Constitution.
Those who begin with this sort of assumption find it difficult to believe that “the Framers
in 1787 were committed to protecting fundamental freedoms, but did not believe enumeration was
the best constitutional strategy for securing cherished individual rights.”128 As Professor Graber
noted,
The persons responsible for the original Constitution thought they had secured
fundamental rights by a combination of representation, the separation of powers,
and the extended republic. The Bill of Rights, in their view, was a minor
supplement to the strategies previously employed for preventing abusive
government practices.129
Similarly, Richard S. Kay observed that the framers of the federal Constitution perceived
“unwritten fundamental rights” as “profoundly important,” but “they agreed that the critical issue
on which their protection turned was the character of the new national government.” 130 Professor

128

Mark A. Graber, Enumeration and Other Constitutional Strategies for Protecting Rights:
The View From 1787/1791, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 357, 362 (2007)
129

Id. at 360. For general support for the view that the framers were initially relying on
alternatives to the enumeration of rights, see MCAFFEE, INHERENT RIGHTS, supra note 124;
McAffee, The Court Over the Constitution, supra note 33, at 1509-1511, 1565-1593; Thomas B.
McAffee, The Federal System as Bill of Rights: Original Understandings, Modern Misreadings,
43 VILL. L. REV. 17, 98-104 (1998) [hereinafter cited as Federal System]; Thomas B McAffee,
Substance Above All: The Utopian Vision of Modern Natural Law Constitutionalists, 4 S. CAL.
INTERDISC. L.J. 501, 516-521 (1996) [hereinafter cited as Utopian Vision].
130

Kay, supra note 122, at 432.
38

Kay concluded there would have been “little point” in the debate over inclusion of a bill of rights
had unenumerated natural rights “been understood as directly enforceable by the courts.” 131
It has thus become a standard objection to any restrained reading of the Ninth Amendment
that it is part of “the historical tendency to misunderstand the meaning of the amendment” and
reflects “the shift of our legal culture from a jurisprudence of natural law to one of legal
positivism.” 132 But the alleged dichotomy between a constitutional jurisprudence based on natural
law and rights, and one based on legal positivism, does not really address, let alone resolve, the
fundamental questions presented about how to interpret the Ninth Amendment. Almost ten years
ago, I wrote:
Three of the thinkers who most influenced the framers of the Constitution, John
Locke, Edward Coke, and William Blackstone, do not supply us with definitive
answers to the questions we would ask. Locke was committed to republican
government and legislative supremacy that went hand in hand with his commitment
to limited government and natural rights enforceable by the people’s inherent right
of revolution. Coke described as void any Act of Parliament that is “against
common right and reason, or repugnant, or impossible to be performed.” Yet
Coke’s famous utterance “seems to have enjoyed only a brief usefulness in preRevolutionary polemics,” for citations to Coke ceased after Blackstone construed
the statement as a mere rule of construction. Blackstone was committed to the
common law and natural law, but he also believed in Parliamentary sovereignty
(and the related idea of legislative supremacy). 133
131

Id.

132

McAffee, Prolegomena, supra note 112, at 113 n. 16 For a recent example of work that
appears to embrace the notion of a presumed dichotomy between natural rights jurisprudence and
constitutional positivism, see Barnett, Who’s Afraid, supra note 118, at 4.
133

McAffee, INHERENT RIGHTS, supra note 124, at 3-4 (citing Dr. Bonham’s Case, 8 Coke
Rep. 107, 118a (1610); JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES: ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801, at 92-93 (1971); Thomas C. Grey, The Original
Understanding and the Unwritten Constitution, in SIX ESSAYS ON THE CONSTITUTION 145, 152
(Neil L. York ed. 1988) [hereinafter cited as The Original Understanding].) Compare McAffee,
The Court Over the Constitution, supra note 33, at 1509-11.
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This pattern, reflected in these intellectual origins of American constitutional thought, is
equally embodied in the works of the most significant founders – those who developed the
thinking that produced the Ninth Amendment during the debate over the ratification of the
Constitution. It was over thirty years ago that Robert Cover observed that “[t]he most telling
aspect of the American variant of constitutional positivism was the enthusiasm for written
constitutions–the almost compulsive mania for rendering the allocation of power explicit.”134
Years before Cover wrote, Professor Corwin stated the view that “legislative sovereignty” lost out
in America because “in the American written constitution, higher law at last attained a form which
made possible the attribution to it of an entirely new sort of validity, the validity of a statute
emanating from the sovereign people.” 135 As Gerald Stourzh has contended, in America the
functioning eighteenth-century British constitution came to recognize “certain imperatives or
prohibitions as fundamental elements of the laws of the land without thereby creating a special
category of legal norms.” 136

134

ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 27
(1975) [hereinafter cited as JUSTICE ACCUSED].
135

EDWARD S. CORWIN, The “Higher Law” Backgroun of American Constitutional Law, in
CORWIN ON THE CONSTITUITON 138-39 ( R. LOSS ED. 1981).
136

Gerald Stourzh, Fundamental Law and Individual Rights in the 18th Centuury
Constitution, in THE AMERICAN FOUNDING–ESSAYS ON THE FORMATION OF THE CONSTITUTION
336 (J. BARLOW, LEONARD LEVY, & K. MASUGI, EDS., 1988). See generally MCAFFEE, INHERENT
RIGHTS, supra note 124, at 65-66 (subsection entitled “The Centrality of the Written Constitution).
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A. The Antifederalists.
Those who opposed ratification of the Constitution in part because of the omission of a bill
of rights – known in history as the Antifederalists – were adamant that a bill of rights was
absolutely essential.137 Their arguments insisting on “the necessity of an express stipulation for all
such rights as are intended to be exempted from the civil authority”138 demonstrate that they were
simultaneously strong advocates of securing natural rights even as they were also strong
constitutional positivists. 139 They repeatedly denied that a written Constitution includes even a
presumption of any sort in favor of fundamental rights, insisting that it is “universally
acknowledged” that the natural rights “can neither be retained to themselves, nor transmitted to
their posterity, unless they are expressly reserved.” 140 Before the Virginia ratifying convention,
Patrick Henry summed up his argument that a bill of rights was “indispensably necessary” by
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Professor Rakove observed that “[t]he logic of the Antifederalist position was deeply
positivist.” Jack N. Rakove, The Dilemma of Declaring Rights, in THE NATURE OF RIGHTS, supra
note 91, at 181, 193. See id. at 193-94 (stating that the Antifederalist arguments “presupposed that
the existence and security of rights depended on their explicit inclusion in the constitutional text”).
138

Essays by the Impartial Examiner (Feb. 20, 1788), reprinted in 5 THE COMPLETE ANTIFEDERALIST 177 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1988) [hereinafter cited as THE COMPLETE ANTIFEDERALIST].
139

The Impartial Examiner contended that each community member must “be presumed to
give up all those powers into the hands of the state by submitting his whole conduct to the
direction thereof.” Michael Lienisch, Reinterpreting Rights: Antifederalists and the Bill of Rights,
in GOVERNMENT PROSCRIBED, supra note 85, at 245, 266, quoting, 5 THE COMPLETE ANTIFEDERALIST, supra note 138, at 177. See supra note 100.
140

Essays by the Impartial Examiner (Feb. 20, 1788), reprinted in 5 THE COMPLETE ANTInote 138, at 176. Accord, Patrick Henry, 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 24,
at 445 (June 14, 1788) (“all nations” have adopted the construction that rights not expressly
reserved are impliedly relinquished); Letters from Agrippa (Jan. 14, 1788), reprinted in 1
SCHWARTZ, supra note 51, at 515 (people “of course” delegated “all rights not expressly
FEDERALIST, supra
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insisting “that a general positive provision should be inserted in the new system, securing to the
states and the people every right which was not conceded to the general government.” 141 In the
well-known Letters of Agrippa, the author concluded that “a constitution does not in itself imply
any more than a declaration of the relation which the different parts of the government have to
each other, but does not imply security to the rights of individuals.” 142 Perhaps the most
thoughtful Antifederalist commentator, the author of Letters from a Federal Farmer, summed up
social contract theory, including the assertion that the people cannot “deprive themselves” of
inalienable natural rights, even as he claimed that they still might “resign” the rights “to those who
govern.” 143

reserved”).
141
3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 24, at 445 (June 14, 1788). See McAffee, Original
Meaning, supra note 43, at 1244. Accord, id. (quoting Henry asserting that “[i]f you intend to
reserve your inalienable rights, you must have the most express stipulation; for, if implication be
allowed, you are ousted of those rights”); Lash, Inescapable Federalism, supra note 54, at 828
(citing Henry’s speech insisting on the need for an “express stipulation”; also observing that Henry
“merges the language of individual rights with that of state autonomy” ).
142

4 THE COMPETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 59, at 108 (Jan. 9, 1788). Following up
on the logic of legislatures with general legislative powers, the same author argued that since “the
whole power resides in the whole body of the nation,” the consequence is that “when a people
appoint certain persons to govern them, they delegate their whole power” unless they reserve
power in the Constitution. Id. at 109. He concluded “that a constitution is not itself a bill of
rights.’” Id. Similarly, the author of Essays by a Farmer posed the rhetorical question: “If a citizen
of Maryland can have no benefit of his own bill of rights in the federal courts, and there is no bill
of rights of the United States–how could he take advantage of a natural right founded in reason,
could he plead it and produce Locke, Sydney, or Montesquieu as authority?” 5 THE COMPLETE
ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 138, at 13 (Feb. 15, 1788). The obvious assumption is that the great
political philosophers who so influenced the revolutionary generation are not legal authorities;
natural rights are not ipso facto constitutional rights, or rights within the civil law. They must be
secured in positive law.
143

Letters from a Federal Farmer, in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 138, at
231. See also The Impartial Examiner, in 5 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 138, at
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A powerful illustration of Antifederalist thought is presented by George Mason, who
authored the Virginia bill of rights. 144 Mason was unquestionably one who was deeply committed
to principles of natural law and natural rights.145 Indeed, a number of modern commentators assert
that Mason’s famous statement that there are “certain inherent rights” of which the people “cannot,
by any compact, deprive or divest their posterity,” 146 was simply “declaratory of limitations which,

175-179 (one who enters society gives up “to government his power to act freely unless he
reserves particular powers,” meaning that it is essential to have “an express stipulation for all such
rights as are intended to be exempted from the civil authority”); David Caldwell, in 4 ELLIOT’S
DEBATES, supra note 24, at 9 (North Carolina Ratifying Convention, July 24, 1788) (arguing that
Constitutions should embody “maxims” deemed fundamental to “every safe and free government,”
and describing one such maxim as the statement that “[u]nalienable rights ought not to be given
up, if not necessary”). For additional documentation that “inalienable” referred to a moral claim,
not a legal one, see McAffee, The Court Over the Constitution, supra note 33, at 1533, 1556-1561.
144

Va. Const., Bill of Rts (1776), reprinted in 7 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 64, at
3813. Kukla strenuously asserts that “Mason believed with all his heart in the urgency of a
declaration of rights.” Jon Kukla, “Yes! No! And If . . . Federalists, Antifederalists, and Virginia’s
“Federalists Who are for Amendments,” in ANTIFEDERALISM, supra note 100, at 43, 59.
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Indeed, Mason argued against a 1682 act of the Virginia assembly, which had purported
to sell certain Indian women into slavery, that it was “void of itself, because contrary to natural
right.” Robin v. Hardaway, Jeff. 109 (Va. 1772), cited in Corwin, The “Higher Law” Background
of American Constitutional Law, in 1 Corwin on the Constitution 79, 199 ( R. Loss ed., 1981).
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Va. Const., Bill of Rts § 1, in 7 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 64 at 3813. Section

1 reads:
That all men are by nature equally free and independent, and have certain
inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of society, they cannot, by
any compact, deprive or divest their posterity: namely, the enjoyment of life and
liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and
obtaining happiness and safety.
Id.
43

because they are inherent, exist as legal limitations whether declared in writing or not.”147
In fact, even though Section 1 of the Virginia Bill of Rights, the Inherent Rights Clause, is
the provision from which Professor Barnett insists the Ninth Amendment was drafted, 148 its
original author was a prominent Antifederalist who opposed ratification of the Constitution, in
significant part because it omitted a bill of rights.149 But if it was universally, or even widely,
believed that natural rights supply legally enforceable limits on government because they’re
inherent, it would have been clear that a bill of rights was simply unnecessary. So Mason’s
objection to the omission of a bill of rights suggests that “inherent” did not mean “legally

147

Thomas B. McAffee, The Bill of Rights, Social Contract Theory, and the Rights
“Retained” by the People, 16 S.I.U. L.J. 267, 281 (1992) [hereinafter Social Contract Theory]. It
was Mason’s “Inherent Rights Clause” that accounts for the title of the book I published:
MCAFFEE, INHERENT RIGHTS, supra note 124. For standard treatments making these claims, see
Grey, The Original Understanding, supra note 133, at 156; Suzanna Sherry, The Founders’
Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1127, 1132-33 (1987) [hereinafter cited as Unwritten
Constitution]. Professor Barnett, in turn, concluded that the Ninth Amendment – drawn from
Roger Sherman’s proposed amendment, which was based on Mason’s Inherent Rights Clause –
was designed to secure each citizen his or her natural “liberty,” and indeed to create a
“presumption of liberty.” BARNETT, RESTORING, supra note 92, at 235 (“[T]he phrase, ‘others
retained by the people,’” was “a reference to the natural or liberty rights that are retained by the
people when forming a government,” and it mandates that “they are not to be ‘denied or
disparaged’”). For a different understanding of the relevance of the Inherent Rights Clause, see
infra notes 148-158 and accompanying texts.
148

See BARNETT, RESTORING, supra note 92, at 246-47 & n. 85 (contending that the
language of Ninth Amendment has a “common ancestry” with natural rights proposals that had
been offered by Virginia and North Carolina.).
149

Indeed, Dean Reinstein observed, in honoring the bicentennial of the Bill of Rights, that
it was George Mason who seconded a motion to add a bill of rights to the proposed federal
Constitution. Robert J. Reinstein, Completing the Constitution: The Declaration of Independence,
Bill of Rights and Fourteenth Amendment, 66 TEMP. L. REV. 361, 364 (1993) [hereinafter cited as
Completing the Constitution]. The motion was, of course, “rejected decisively.” Id.
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enforceable” to Mason. 150 But his objections went further still. He objected to the omission of
Article II of the Articles of Confederation, contending that without such a provision “many
valuable and important rights” would be considered to be “given up.” 151 Mason also stated what
became the standard Antifederalist argument that “the Laws of the general Government being
paramount to the Laws and Constitutions of the several states, the Declarations of Rights in the
separate states are no security.” 152
Almost twenty years ago, I wrote:
If natural rights were viewed as creating inherent and enforceable legal limits on the
scope of granted powers, Mason and others should logically have viewed the
150

It has been observed that

when the state constitutions made reference to “inherent” or “inalienable” natural
rights, these statements of principle were taken to be just that. They were taken as
widely accepted statements of political principle, but not as enforceable limits to
government power. This is what enabled Alexander Hamilton to argue that
expressly stating the doctrine of popular sovereignty, and thereby acknowledging
the authority of the people to amend their constitutional system to better meet their
needs and to secure their rights, “is a better recognition of popular rights than
volumes of those aphorisms which make the principal figure in several of our state
bills of rights, and which would sound much better in a treatise on ethics than in a
constitution of government.”
McAffee, The Court Over the Constitution, supra note 33, at 1505 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No.
84, at 579 (Jacob Cooke ed., 1961).)
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George Mason, 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 24, at 444 (June 14, 1788).
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13 RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 20, at 348 (Oct. 7, 1787). Indeed,
“[a] typical argument was that the Supremacy Clause implied ‘that the constitutions and laws of
every state are nullified and declared void, so far as they are or shall be inconsistent with this
constitution.’” McAffee, Prolegomena, supra note 57, at 138 n. 99 (citing 2 THE COMPLETE ANTIFEDERALIST, supra note 138, at 362, 365 (Essays of Brutus Oct. 18, 1787).) Some went even
further, arguing that the Supremacy Clause was added “to prevent the possibility of doubt that the
consequence would be consolidated government that ruled by an “iron-handed despotism.” Letter
of Centinel V (Nov. 30, 1787), in THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 138, at 168.
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supremacy clause as subject to these implied limitations, particularly since the
supremacy clause grants the status of supreme law only to laws enacted pursuant to
the Constitution. Implicit in Mason’s argument is the assumption that natural rights
had become binding constitutional norms by virtue of their inclusion within the
state constitutions; since those constitutions were inferior to the federal constitution,
it followed that the natural rights would be forfeited to the extent that federal
powers were construed broadly enough to reach them. 153
Mason may well have learned a thing or two from the experience of presenting his draft of
the inherent rights proposal to the convention that inserted it into the Virginia constitution.
Because the Inherent Rights Clause that became section one of the Virginia bill of rights initially
embodied the “natural equality principle,” 154 it created a fear that the provision would make
slavery unconstitutional. The result was that the provision was amended. “With the critical
change italicized, the amended provision stated that all men are ‘by nature free and independent,
and have certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter into society, they cannot, by any
compact, deprive or divest their posterity.’” 155 The amendment clarified “that the fundamental
rights that people retain as they enter civil society did not apply to the Black race because the
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McAffee, Social Contract Theory, supra note 147, at 281. Responsive Federalists took
Mason’s argument as a straightforward positivist argument about the constitutional text’s meaning.
E.g., Letter from Roger Sherman to Unknown (Dec. 8, 1787), in 14 RATIFICATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION, supra note 20, at 386-87 (contending that Supremacy Clause applied only to laws
not exceeding powers granted by the Constitution and that the states would police system to ensure
that federal government did not overstep its boundaries); id. at 389 (to have “a well regulated
government, the legislature should be dependent on the people, and be vested with a plenitude of
power . . . to be exercised only for the public good”).
154

The clause states “[t]hat all men are by nature equally free and independent . . . .” Va.
Const., Bill of Rts § 1 (1776), reprinted in 7 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 64, at 3813.
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MCAFFEE, INHERENT RIGHTS, supra note 124, at 18 (quoting id).
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slaves had never entered into a state of civil society in Virginia.”156 There could hardly be a more
starkly positivist move than this amendment; it seems quite clear that if all are “by nature” free and
independent, those rights would remain valid moral claims quite apart from whether someone
thought you had, or had not, left the state of nature and entered “into society.” 157
In view of Mason’s experience with the Inherent Rights Clause, it is entirely unsurprising
that when Mason drafted a proposed bill of rights in 1788 – for the Virginia Ratifying Convention
– the two changes from the Virginia Bill of Rights were: (1) the omission of the Inherent Rights
Clause, which included the “natural equality” principle; and (2) the conditioning of a number of
specific enumerated rights to “freemen” only. 158 Professor Reinstein concluded:
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Id. See also Reinstein, Completing the Constitution, supra note 149, at 370-72; Warren
M. Billings, “That All Men are Born Equally Free and Independent”: Virginians and the Origins
of the Bill of Rights, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND THE STATES 335, 339-40 (Patrick J. Conley &
John P. Kaminski, eds. 1992).
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The language change, however, enabled Edmund Randolph to contend that “the slaves
not being constituent members of our society could never pretend to any benefits from such a
maxim.” Barry A. Shain, Rights Natural and Civil in the Declaration of Independence, in THE
NATURE OF RIGHTS, supra note 91, at 116, 118. Virginia’s section 1 itself appears to have rested
to a degree on a basic ambiguity, between “natural” rights and customary (or common law) rights,
that was exploited by revolutionary Americans; thus many contended, “No man will deny that
provincial Americans have an inherent, unalienable Right to all the Privileges of British subjects.”
Id. at 129. Accord, id. at 136 (noting that James Duane preferred “grounding our Rights on the
Laws and Constitution of the Country from when we sprung,” and contended that the “Privileges
of Englishmen were inherent” and “an inheritance,” meaning that we could not be “deprived of
them”); MCAFFEE, BYBEE, & BRYANT, POWERS RESERVED, supra note 37, at 62 n. 150 (noting
that arguments against writs of assistance were based on view that “acts against the fundamental
principles of the British constitution are void,” even while claiming that “[t]his doctrine is
agreeable to the laws of nature”).
158

For the specific content of Mason’s proposed bill of rights – substituting “freeman” for
persons or people, etc. – presented at the Virginia Ratifying Convention, see Reinstein, Completing
the Constitution, supra note 149, at app. B, arts. 9, 10, 12, 14, 15. Mason’s reference was not
altogether unique. In his Inaugural Address, President Washington – likely with Madison’s help as
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Mason’s revisions, taken together, would have done more than insure a bill of rights
in the United States Constitution would not threaten slavery. By explicitly
conditioning rights to “freemen” only, Mason’s revisions would have legitimated
the institution of slavery. This proposal would have incorporated the Declaration’s
inalienable rights, but for white people only. 159
At an equally fundamental level, Virginia’s “inherent rights” provision itself has generally
not been viewed, or treated by courts, as generating a legally enforceable limitation on government
power. 160 Professor G. Alan Tarr observed that the inherent rights clause – like many provisions
in the state declarations of rights – was “addressed not to the state judiciary primarily but to the
people’s representatives, who were to be guided by them in legislating, and even more to the
liberty-loving and vigilant citizenry that was to oversee the exercise of government power.” 161

a ghost writer – suggested that the parameters of the new bill of rights were “a reverence for the
characteristic rights of freemen, and a regard for public harmony. . . .” 2 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE
WASHINGTON 176 (W.W. Abbot ed., 1987), cited in Reinstein, Completing the Constitution, supra
note 149, at 374.
159

Id. at 372. Even when efforts to invoke the “natural equality” principle in courts failed,
it remained clear that constitutional drafters continued to equate such declarations with freedom.
Hence slave state constitutions either completely omitted the “free and equal clause” from their
documents, or added a “peculiar transformation” of language in the attempt to “make it consistent
with the peculiar institution of slavery.” Id. at 377-78.
160

See Thomas B. McAffee, The “Foundations” of Anti-Foundationalism – Or, Taking the
Ninth Amendment Lightly: A Comment on Daniel A. Farber’s Book on the Ninth Amendment,
___ NEV. L.J. [9-10] (2008) [hereinafter Foundations] (reviewing Farber’s RETAINED BY THE
PEOPLE: THE “SILENT” NINTH AMENDMENT AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AMERICANS DON’T
KNOW THEY HAVE (2007)).
161

G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 78 (1998). Accord, Rakove,
The Dilemma of Declaring Rights, in THE NATURE OF RIGHTS, supra note 91, at 181, 190 (bills of
rights in early constitutions were “conceived as statements of principle meant to guide the behavior
of officials and citizens alike,” not as “actual restraints”). See also MCAFFEE, BYBEE, & BRYANT,
POWERS RESERVED, supra note 37, at 12-13; Nathan N. Frost, Rachel Beth Klein-Levine, &
Thomas B. McAffee, Courts Over Constitutions Revisited: Unwritten Constitutionalism in the
States, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 333, 360-69 [hereinafter Courts Over Constitutions].
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Modern Americans often have no grasp of how founding-era Americans viewed the claims in their
declarations of rights:
The declarations’ individual rights provisions were framed in terms of ‘ought’ or
‘ought not’ rather than ‘shall’ or ‘shall not,’ or occasionally as statements of
political ideals. These formulations were clearly not inadvertent. . . . This wording
very probably reflects in part the idea of restating the fundamental principles, which
inherently bind government, as opposed to promulgating new sovereign commands.
In a sense, this language conveys their greater importance; but in another sense, it
also reflects the recognition of the drafters that such principles are to be honored
rather than enforced. The language of the declarations conveys the idea that the
enumerated liberties were “serious principles by which government was to abide,”
but were nevertheless subject in general to qualification as essential for the public
good. 162
It is thus almost certainly no coincidence that the ratifying convention proposals to include
“inherent rights clauses” in the proposed amendments to be added to the new Constitution
prompted Madison to propose language, clearly based on Virginia’s inherent rights provision, to be
inserted in a proposed “prefix” to the Constitution.163 A crucial aspect of the development was
that Madison, apparently encouraged by a letter from Thomas Jefferson, “substituted words of
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MCAFFEE, INHERENT RIGHTS, supra note 124, at 24 (quoting Robert C. Palmer, Liberties
as Constitutional Provisions, 1776-1791, in CONSTITUTION AND RIGHTS IN THE EARLY AMERICAN
REPUBLIC 65, 75 (1987).)
163

This development is described at supra note 64 and accompanying text. Compare
MCAFFEE, BYBEE, & BRYANT, POWERS RESERVED, supra note 37, at 16 (noting that drafters of
state declarations of rights did not “regard rights as enforceable against the legislature or
executive,” frequently using “the term ‘ought’ instead of the mandatory ‘shall in their
declarations”); id. at 30-31 (linking state plenary power conception to debate over omission of a
bill of rights).
Madison did not go to the extremes that Mason did; He used “person” or “people” instead
of “freeman” in the enumeration of rights, and he also omitted the “free and equal clause,”
substituting words that did not refer to natural rights. Reinstein, Completing the Constitution,
supra note 149, at 372.
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command and prohibition for the hortatory language that had dominated the Declarations of
Rights.” 164 His proposed amendment to be added to the preamble, as a prefix to the Constitution,
read as follows:
That there be prefixed to the constitution a declaration, that all power is originally
vested in, and consequently derived from the people.
That Government is instituted and ought to be exercised for the benefit of
the people; which consists in the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right of
acquiring and using property, and generally of pursuing and obtaining happiness
and safety.
That the people have an indubitable, unalienable, and indefeasible right to
reform or change their Government, whenever it be found adverse or inadequate to
the purposes of its institution. 165
Just as Madison had reworded the amendments proposed by the state ratifying conventions
to try to ensure that they could be legally enforceable, it is noteworthy that he retained the
language of principle, not command, in the proposed amendment to be included in the
Constitution’s preamble. Madison summarized the inherent rights language without referring to
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McAffee, Foundations, supra note 160, at 10. See McAffee, Inalienable Rights, supra
note 37, at 769-71.
165

James Madison, Speech to the House Explaining His Proposed Amendments and His
Notes for the Amendment Speech, in 1 RIGHTS RETAINED, supra note 48, at 54.
Cf. Va. Const. Of 1776, Bill of Rights, §§ 1, 3, reprinted in 7 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra
note 64, at 3812, 3813 (asserting that “all men are by nature equally free and independent, and
have certain inherent rights of which, when they enter into a state of society, they cannot, by any
compact, deprive or divest their posterity; namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the
means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety;”
and that government is “instituted for the common benefit, protection, and security of the people . .
. ; and that, when any government shall be found inadequate or contrary to these purposes, a
majority of the community hath an . . . inalienable . . . right to reform, alter, or abolish it, in such
manner as shall be judged most conducive to the public weal”).
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the relevant interests with that term. 166 He also followed the lead of the New York state ratifying
convention, which had proposed an amendment that referred to the same specified rights as
“essential rights which every Government ought to respect and preserve.” 167 Madison’s steps may
well have reflected an attempt to move “in the direction of supporting government,” as he begins
with society as a starting point and refers to government being for the “benefit of the people,”
rather than referring to “inherent rights of which man cannot be divested.” 168 A more sinister
evaluation is that “[t]he Founders deliberately omitted the Declaration [of Independence’s]
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Dean Reinstein observed that:
Even without the declaration that all people are by nature free
and equal, a constitutional provision asserting the existence of
‘certain natural rights’ might be applied against slavery, because
both English and American courts had held that this institution
violates all natural rights. So Madison omitted the clause on natural
rights as well. Instead, he borrowed language from the Declaration
of Independence and the Virginia Declaration of Rights but used it in
a way that deprived those declarations of any force.

Reinstein, Completing the Constitution, supra note 149, at 373.
167

See Amendments Proposed by the New York Convention, July 26, 1788, in
DOCUMENTARY RECORD, supra note 24, at 21 (“That the enjoyment of Life, Liberty, and the
pursuit of Happiness are essential rights which every Government ought to respect”) (emphasis
added in text).
168

Herbert J. Storing, The Constitution and the Bill of Rights, in HOW DOES THE
CONSTITUTION SECURE RIGHTS? 15, 53 n.50 (Robert A. Goldwin & William A. Schambra eds.
1985). In any event, it not only is now well established that preambles are not operative
provisions that are legally enforceable, but Edmund Randolph, writing his opinion as Attorney
General on the constitutionality of the national bank, suggested that the preamble is at most
“declarative only of the views of the convention,” indicating what “they supposed to be best
fulfilled by the powers delineated; and that such is the legitimate nature of preambles.” Walter
Dellinger & H. Jefferson Powell, The Constitutionality of the Bank Bill: The Attorney General’s
First Constitutional Law Opinions, 44 DUKE L.J. 110, 126 (1994)
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doctrine of equal rights from the Bill of Rights, not because that doctrine was considered mere
rhetoric, but because its inclusion in the Constitution would have been dangerous to the continuous
existence of slavery.” 169 Whatever the explanation, it appears that Madison drafted the language “in
the ‘softer’ format that had characterized state declarations, despite the marked trend in another
direction” because “he was seeking to avoid legally undermining slavery even while paying
appropriate lip service to basic principle.” 170
B. The Federalists
A thorough analysis of the ratification-era debates strongly confirms that its participants were
in general agreement that the basic questions they needed to address related to how best to interpret
the positive law of the Constitution.171 Under the state constitutions that were the forerunners of the
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Robert J. Reinstein, Completing the Constitution, supra note 149, at 362-63. Surely
Madison would have been aware that many in the South opposed a bill of rights for the reason
offered by Charles Cotesworth Pinckney as part of the South Carolina ratification debate. Pinckney
argued that “[s]uch bills generally begin with declaring that all men are by nature born free,” an
assertion that would be made “with a very bad grace, when a large part of our property consists of
men who are actually born slaves.” Akhil Reed Amar, The Creation, Reconstruction, and
Interpretation of the Bill of Rights, in THE NATURE OF RIGHTS , supra note 91, at 163, 171 (citing
JONATHAN ELLIOT, FOUR DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 316 (1836)).
170

Thomas B. McAffee, Did the Federal Constitution “Incorporate” the Declaration of
Independence?, 1 NEV. LJ. 138, 153-155 (2001). Pauline Maier observed that Madison and others
possibly perceived that the Declaration’s principles “might impede the foundation of a stable,
effective national government.” PAULINE MAIER, AMERICAN SCRIPTURE: MAKING THE
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 195 (1998). But it may be that “Madison feared alienating the
support of slaveholders,” and thus he acquiesced in the rejection of his “pared-down version of the
Virginia Declaration of Rights.” Id. See also Pauline Maier, The Strange History of “All Men Are
Created Equal,” 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 873, 881 (1999) (contending that “Madison’s ‘prefix’ was
probably designed in part to calm antifederalists without provoking slave holders,” but observing
that “Congress instead eliminated the ‘prefix’ altogether”).
171

In an important book on the ratification-era debate on the proposed Constitution, the
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Constitution being debated, it was rather clear that “the people” had not “retained” any
constitutionally protected (and hence legally enforceable) rights automatically.172 Indeed those who
drafted the state constitutions, we learn from Professor Lutz, “assumed that government had all
power except for specific prohibitions contained in a bill of rights.” 173 Theophilus Parsons, who

editors summed up the Federalist position:
Federalists rejected the proposition that a bill of rights was needed. They
made a clear distinction between the state constitutions and the U.S. Constitution.
Using the language of social compact, Federalists asserted that when people formed
their state constitutions, they delegated to the states all rights and power which were
not explicitly reserved to the people. The state governments had authority to regulate
even personal and private matters. But in the U.S. Constitution, the people or the
states retained all rights and powers that were not positively granted to the federal
government. In short, everything not given was reserved. The U.S. government had
strictly delegated powers, limited to the general interests of the nation.
Therefore, Federalists argued, a bill of rights was not only unnecessary, but
might even be dangerous. Unnecessary, because the new federal government could
no way endanger freedom of the press or religion, for instance, since it was given no
constitutional power to regulate either. Dangerous, because a listing of rights could
be interpreted as inclusive. Rights omitted might be considered as not retained. And
the listing of rights, such as freedom of the press, might imply that a power to
regulate the press existed absent the provision.
THE FEDERALISTS AND ANTIFEDERALISTS–THE DEBATE OVER THE RATIFICATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION 151-52 (JOHN P. KAMINSKI & RICHARD LEFFLER EDS., 1998).
172

This bit of common ground is what explains the Federalist reliance on the enumerated
powers scheme as an alternative to a bill of rights, rather than the general idea that there are natural
or inherent rights; it is also the reason most thoughtful commentators have thought the
Antifederalists had the better of the argument. See supra notes 100, 139.
173

DONALD S. LUTZ, POPULAR CONSENT AND POPULAR CONTROL: WHIG POLITICAL THEORY
IN THE EARLY STATE CONSTITUTIONS 60 (1980). Lutz’s characterization of the intentions of those
who drafted the state constitutions and declarations of rights is strongly confirmed by Wilson’s
defense of the omission of a bill of rights based on the Constitution’s grant of limited and defined
powers. See supra note 39. It is critical to distinguish, however, between the framers’ description of
the legal effect of granting or retaining specific powers and the same framers’ conceptions of the
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became a Federalist proponent of the Constitution contended, in opposition to a proposed
Massachusetts constitution in 1778, that the people’s rights “ought to be settled and established,
previous to the ratification of any constitution for the State.”174
Nathaniel Gorham explained that “a bill of rights in state governments was intended to retain
certain power [in the people] as the legislatures had unlimited powers.” 175 The Federalist
proponents of the Constitution “referred to the ‘rights of the people’ as ‘powers reserved,’ or as
reserved rights and powers.” 176 Since a Bill of Rights was “an enumeration of the powers reserved,”

natural rights to which they were entitled. On one hand, Edmund Randolph referred to “those
paramount rights, which a free people cannot be supposed to confide even to their representatives,”
even though the legislature is “instituted” by a written constitution under which it is “presumed to be
at large as to all authority which is communicable by the people.” Dellinger & Powell, supra note
156, at 122-23 (editing and reprinting Randolph’s opinion on the constitutionality of the proposed
national bank). Despite this qualification even of “general” legislative powers, Randolph still
suggests that “[e]ssentially otherwise is the condition of a legislature whose powers are described,”
because then “it claims no powers which are not delegated to it.” Id. at 123. Randolph would not
reject Lutz’s conclusion that the framers of the state constitutions intended legally that state
legislatures held all power “except for specific prohibitions contained in a bill of rights;” rights could
be “inalienable” or “paramount,” morally, but became legal limits on government power only by
being placed in a bill of rights. This is the only reason that Randolph could argue that the “best
security” of rights was “the express enumeration of powers,” even as he acknowledged the need for
a bill of rights in state constitutions. 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 24, at 467 (Virginia Ratifying
Convention, June 15, 1788). See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
174

Quoted in, CLINTON ROSSITER, SEEDTIME OF THE REPUBLIC: THE ORIGIN OF THE
AMERICAN TRADITION OF POLITICAL LIBERTY 422 (1953). The Reverand Jonas Clark similarly
contended that “it is of the highest importance . . . that said rights intended to be retained, at least
those that are fundamental to the well-being of society and the liberty and safety of individuals,
should be in the most explicit terms declared.” Id. (emphasis added).
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1 RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 20, at 335 (Sept. 27, 1787).

176

See McAffee, Original Meaning, supra note 43, at 1247. James Wilson went so far as to
assert that “the powers given and reserved form the whole rights of the people.” 2 RATIFICATION OF
THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 20, at 469, 470 (Dec. 4, 1787). Cf. 3 FARRAND supra note 81, at
255, 256 (C.C. Pinckney) (delegation of powers reserves “every power and right not mentioned”).
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it followed that “[i]f we attempt an enumeration, everything that is not enumerated is presumed to be
given.” 177 The Federalists were thus concerned that a bill of rights “would at least imply that
nothing more was left with the people than the rights defined and secured in such bill of rights.” 178
Despite the limitations found in article I, sections 9 and 10, it remained quite clear, even long after
adoption of the federal Constitution, that states constitutionally could pass a bill of attainder or an ex
post facto law if the text of the constitution of the State did not prohibit the state from so using its
law-making power. 179 The “right” to be free of legislative trials and laws criminalizing an act
retroactively were “retained,” under the state constitutions, only when such a right was “stated as a
limitation to the plenary power held by state legislatures in the state’s Declaration of Rights.” 180

These figures believed that what was “reserved” when the federal government was granted limited
powers would constitute an adequate group of rights. This is why Professor Bowling refers to the
Ninth and Tenth Amendments as “the reservation amendments.” Kenneth B. Bowling,
Overshadowed by States’ Rights: Ratification of the Federal Bill of Rights, in GOVERNMENT
PROSCRIBED, supra note 85, at 95.
177

James Wilson, 2 RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 20, at 387, 388
(Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention, Nov. 28, 1787). The Federalists were anxious, then, that an
“enumeration of rights must not suggest a government of unenumerated power.” Lash, Lost
Original Meaning, supra note 45, at 358.
178

Letter from Samuel Holden Parsons to William Cushing (Jan. 11, 1788), in 3
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 20, at 569 (emphasis added). Thus Wilson could
contend that “a bill of rights would have been improperly annexed to the federal plan” inasmuch as
“it would imply that whatever is not expressed was given, which is not the principle of the proposed
Constitution.” James Wilson, Speech at the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention (Nov. 28, 1787), in
2 RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION , supra note 20 at 391 (emphasis added).
179

McAffee, Liberty Over Law, supra note 33, at 1546-47 (observing that Justice Joseph
Story stated quite clearly that a “every state, unless prohibited by its own constitution, might pass a
bill of attainder, or ex post facto law, as a general result of its sovereign legislative power”).
180

Id. at 1547 n. 246.
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Dean Reinstein underscored that the Constitution’s Federalist defenders contended that bills
of rights had been “necessary to limit the powers of otherwise omnipotent monarchs.”181 By
contrast, since the proposed Constitution recognized the people’s sovereignty, and “the government
had only those powers delegated to it,” the “people’s rights should be secured by the structure of the
new government and not by an enumeration of rights.” 182 The Federalists were also intensely aware
that the state declarations of rights were generally drafted in hortatory language, suggesting that
those who drafted them were not contemplating legal enforcement, a phenomenon that led many of
them to conclude that “[a] bill of rights was also useless because it would be unenforceable,” and
government “would not be stopped by any ‘paper guarantee.’” 183
Despite their strikingly different views about the nature of the proposed Constitution, both
the Federalists and Antifederalists completely agreed that only laws that violated express
prohibitions were unconstitutional under the state constitutions that preceded the federal
Constitution. This is amply documented:
It was a standard view that the state governments, ‘unlike governments of delegated
and enumerated powers, had (as representatives of the sovereign people) all powers
not constitutionally forbidden them. The consistent understanding was that as a
government of ‘plenary’ power, ‘a state constitution does not grant governmental
power but merely structures and limits it.’ To its Framers, precisely because the
proposed federal Constitution gave power to the national government only when it
was explicitly conferred, it raised an inference in favor of liberty. 184
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Reinstein, Completing the Constitution, supra note 149, at 366.
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Id.
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Id. (quoting Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), in 11 THE
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 295-300 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds. 1977).)
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Frost, Klein-Levine, & McAffee, Courts Over Constitutions, supra note 161, at 339
(citing Forrest McDonald, The Bill of Rights: Unnecessary and Pernicious, in GOVERNMENT
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It was precisely because the “rights” were understood by reference to the powers that had been
delegated to the nation that both parties to the bill of rights dispute could refer interchangeably to
rights “retained” by the people and rights “reserved” to the states.

So Patrick Henry could insist

that it “was expressly declared in our Confederation that every right was retained by the states,
respectively, which was not given up to the government of the United States.” 185
By contrast, several modern commentators, including in particular Professor Barnett, contend
that the Ninth Amendment embodies the social contract moral and political theory of America’s
Lockean founders, including a guarantee of natural liberty rights that were “retained” by the people.
But even advocates of this reading of the Ninth Amendment often acknowledge that “early in our
legal history judges made a decided turn away from natural rights as a basis of limiting legislative
power and towards a positivist approach that enforced whatever laws did not violate express
prohibitions.” 186 According to Professor Barnett, this “positivist” approach did not manifest itself

PROSCRIBED, supra note 85, at 387, 388, and TARR, supra note 81, at 7; G. ALAN TARR & MARY
CORNELIA PORTER, STATE SUPREME COURTS IN STATE AND NATION 50 (1988).). See also McAffee,
Inalienable Rights, supra note 37, at 749-51. Even Professor Massey, a longtime advocate of
unenumerated rights under the Ninth Amendment, acknowledged that the state constitutions rested
on a presumption that state governments possess “all powers except those explicitly denied” to them.
CALVIN MASSEY, SILENT RIGHTS: THE NINTH AMENDMENT AND THE CONSTITUTION’S
UNENUMERATED RIGHTS 87 (1995).
185

Patrick Henry, Debates in the Convention of the State of Virginia (June 14, 1788), in 3
ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 24, at 445-46.
186

Randy E. Barnett, Who’s Afraid, supra note 118, at 5. In fact, as we have seen the project
of the first Congress was to consolidate rights.
As nervous as all centrists about the instability of rights arguments, they
pruned the open-ended, natural-rights abstractions out of the document with the rigor
of men determined to lock up that line of argument against the future and the external
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until the well-known Chase/Iredell debate in Calder v. Bull, 187 a decision that illustrated a
developing reluctance of courts “to explicitly protect unenumerated rights.”188 Justice Chase, of
course, was emphatic that “the nature and terms of the social compact” are “the foundation of the
legislative power,” and will invalidate laws even though “its authority should not be expressly
restrained by the Constitution, or fundamental law, of the State.” 189 As Professor Grey observed,
however, Justice Chase also acknowledged that the state legislatures “retain all the powers of
legislation, delegated to them by the state constitutions; which are not expressly taken away by the
constitution of the United States.” 190 Indeed, Professor Grey states that despite acknowledging
conventional understandings, Justice Chase apparently concluded that “this plenary legislative power

democratic clamor. Many of them hoped to make the language of rights routine and
merely legalistic.
Daniel T. Rogers, Rights Consciousness in American History, in THE NATURE OF RIGHTS , supra
note 91, at 258, 264.
187

3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).

188

Barnett, supra note 20, at 3. Barnett’s useful discussion of the Chase/Iredell debate is
found at id. at 3-6. Similarly, Professor Grey asserts that “Iredell gave what seems to be the first
explicit statement of full-fledged constitutional positivism; the doctrine of judicial review can
enforce written but not unwritten constitutional principles.” Grey, The Original Understanding,
supra note 133, at145, 149. For a critical reaction, see MCAFFEE, BYBEE, & BRYANT, POWERS
RESERVED, supra note 37, at 50 n. 12. James Wilson and Federalist defenders of the Constitution
clearly interpreted the state constitutions as granting plenary powers to their legislatures, while
enumerated powers almost reversed this presumption in favor of government power. See supra note
39 and accompanying text.
189

Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 387 (1798) (emphasis subtracted).
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Id. at 399. See Grey, The Original Understanding supra note 133, at 148.
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was not so plenary after all.”191
In discussing Iredell’s contribution to the debate in Calder, Barnett concludes that what is
“both interesting and disturbing is how it contrasts with his colorful affirmation of unenumerated
rights before the North Carolina ratification convention ten years earlier.” 192 It is certainly true that
Iredell had referred to unnamed rights when debating the ratification of the Constitution in North
Carolina. Specifically he had said:
[I]t would be not only useless, but dangerous, to enumerate a number of rights which
are not intended to be given up; because it would be implying, in the strongest
manner, that every right not included in the exception might be impaired by the
government without usurpation; and it would be impossible to enumerate every one.
Let any one make what collection or enumeration of rights he pleases, I will
immediately mention twenty or thirty more rights not contained in it. 193
Iredell had asserted in North Carolina, says Barnett, “that impairing such unenumerated rights would
be a usurpation.” 194 Moreover, Barnett argues, “nowhere in this speech does he suggest
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Grey, The Original Understanding, supra note 133, at 148. It is critical to realize that
unwritten constitutionalism necessitates viewing legislatures as not holding “plenary” powers; but,
as Calder illustrates, this is a view that contradicts the assumptions of both the Federalist and
Antifederalist participants in the ratification-era debate over the omission of a bill of rights.
192

Barnett, The Ninth Amendment, supra note 32, at 4 (citing 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra
note 24, at 167).
193

4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 24, at 167 (July 28, 1788) (emphasis added). See also id.
at 149 (arguing that a bill of rights “would not only be incongruous, but dangerous,” because it woud
be construed as showing “that the people did not think every power retained which was not given,”
with the implication that a bill of rights “might operate as a snare rather than a protection”). Iredell
was not so much articulating the need for an “unenumerated” rights clause as he was trying to
indicate the advantages of the limited powers scheme as a device for securing valid moral claims
(rights) as contrasted to a legislature of general powers being subjected only to the limits stated in a
bill of rights. See infra note 200 and accompanying text.
194

For analysis and interpretation of Iredell’s comments, see Barnett, The Police Power,
supra note 120, at 445-46 (asserting that only Iredell’s assurance of the range and scope of
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that only enumerated limitations on legislative power would be enforceable, as he later did in
Calder.” 195
The evidence, however, reveals that Iredell held a consistent view over the entire ten year
period. Iredell’s presentation in North Carolina was delivered in the midst of a debate about how
best to secure inalienable natural rights. The Antifederalist, Samuel Spencer, had objected that
“[t]here is no declaration of rights, to secure to every member of the society those unalienable rights
which ought not to be given up to any government.” 196 In response, Iredell assured that the natural
rights would be secure if there is “such a definition of authority as would leave no doubt 197 ” so that
“any person by inspecting the Constitution may see if the power claimed be enumerated.”198 It is in

unenumerated rights can explain how he “eventually adopted so short a list as those contained in the
Constitution and the Bill of Rights”). Barnett’s interpretation tracks with Suzanna Sherry’s, and
both read Iredell’s reference to “rights which are not intended to be given up” to be referring to
inalienable natural rights. See Sherry, Unwritten Constitution, supra note 142, at 1164-66. But there
are good reasons to think that Iredell was referring to rights not “given up” by virtue of the limited
grant of federal power, especially given that he so clearly stated that the rights are presumptively
“given up” to a legislature with general powers. Given Iredell’s endorsement of the necessity of a
Bill of Rights under the state constitutions (see infra note 200 and accompanying text), his concern
appears to have been that shifting to a bill containing specific limitations might mean that the
Constitution would establish a national legislature of general powers (like the states), thereby
effectively eliminating the rights reserved by the limited powers scheme.
195

Id. Though Iredell clearly perceived unenumerated natural rights, it is just as clear that he
did not perceive them as legally binding as to a government with general legislative powers. See
infra note 200 and accompanying text.
196

4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 24, at 137 (North Carolina Ratifying Convention, July 28,
1788). Notice that Spencer characterizes the claim that a right is “unalienable” as fundamentally a
moral claim – that which “ought not be given up to any government.”
197

Id. at 171 (July 29, 1788).

198

Id. at 172 (emphasis added). Iredell responds to the claim that the rights required the
protection of a “fence” to mark them off, which Iredell describes as the insistence that “there ought
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this context that Iredell explains that his fear of a negative inference as to omitted rights rested on a
concern that a later generation might deduce from a bill of rights that “the people did not think every
power retained which was not given.” 199
At the same ratifying convention in 1788, Iredell was extremely clear that, as to a
government with general legislative powers, a law conflicting with an unstated right would not be
seen as “impairing” the unenumerated right, or as a usurpation, and that “only enumerated
limitations on legislative power would be enforceable.”
If we had formed a general legislature, with undefined powers, a bill of rights would
not only have been proper, but necessary; and it would have then operated as an
exception to the legislative authority in such particulars. It has this effect in respect to
some of the American constitutions, where the powers of legislation are general. But
where they are powers of a particular nature, and expressly defined, as in the case of
the [federal] Constitution before us, I think, for the reasons I have given, a bill of
rights is not only unnecessary, but would be absurd and dangerous. 200
Iredell’s argument follows the Federalist pattern of formulating the feared “danger” as a
reversal of the assumptions that justified the argument against the necessity of a bill of rights. For
example, at one point Madison observed that the Constitution provides that “every thing not granted
is reserved,” but then contended that “[i]f an enumeration be made of our rights” it will be “implied
that every thing omitted is given to the general government.”201 For example, at one point Madison

to protection of a “fence provided against future encroachments of power.” Id. at 171.
199
Id. at 149.
200

4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 24, at 149. Iredell clearly fully accepted the Federalist
position that the distinction between governments of general versus enumerated legislative powers
explained the need, or lack of need, for a bill of rights. This is a theme that has been carefully
documented for almost twenty years. See McAffee, Original Meaning, supra note 43, at 1267-1268.
201

3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 24, at 620 (June 24, 1788). See supra note 50 and
accompanying text.
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observed that the Constitution provides that “every thing not granted is reserved,” but then
contended that “[i]f an enumeration be made of our rights” it will be “implied that every thing
omitted is given to the general government.”202 This is why it is misleading to rely starkly on
Madison’s contention that a bill of rights would be dangerous “‘because an enumeration which is not
complete is not safe.’” 203 If one correctly gathers that Madison was confident, on the one hand, that
in the Constitution as drafted “every thing not granted is reserved,” one quickly realizes that it is
only adding a bill of rights to the enumerated powers scheme that could imply “that everything
omitted is given to the general government.”204
Thus, Madison further clarified his point by asserting that “[s]uch an enumeration could not
be made, within any compass of time, as would be equal to a general negation, such as his honorable
friend (Mr. Wythe) had proposed.” 205 George Wythe, a Federalist proponent of the Constitution, had
submitted to the Virginia Ratifying Convention a “resolution of ratification” that had stated “that
every power, not granted [by the Constitution], remains with [the people], and at their will; that,
therefore, no right, of any denomination, can be cancelled, abridged, restrained, or modified, by the
Congress . . . except in those instances in which power is given by the Constitution for those
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3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 24, at 620 (June 24, 1788).
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Sherry, Unwritten Constitution, supra note 142, at 1163 (quoting Madison, 3 ELLIOT’S
DEBATES, supra note 24, at 626 (Virginia Ratifying Convention, June 24, 1788)). Sherry takes
Madison as referring to the potential loss of “unenumerated” rights–thinking of additional, but
unmentioned limits, on granted powers in favor of rights.
204
205

See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
James Madison, Virginia Ratifying Convention, in 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 24, at

626-27.
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purposes.” 206 In short, before the Virginia Ratifying Convention Madison linked the problem of an
inevitably imperfect enumeration of rights with the Federalist assumption that a vast range of rights,
too numerous to list, are secured by the enumerated powers scheme and threatened by the insertion
of a bill of rights. 207
V.
The Ninth Amendment and Post-Adoption Evidence
One of the challenges facing those who seek the original meaning of the Ninth
Amendment is precisely that the history of the amendment relates both to rights and powers and is
easily tied to early disputes about national power under our federal system. While the early
post-Griswold debate over the meaning of Ninth Amendment focused almost exclusively on the
ratification-era dispute over the omission of a bill of rights that led to the proposed amendments of
the state ratifying conventions, in recent years scholars have increasingly looked at evidence
generated by subsequent efforts to explicate the scope of federal powers under the Constitution.
The Federalists always contended that the limits on federal power implicit in our federal system, and
most especially its system of limited and enumerated powers, would do a great deal to secure a
number of the rights that might otherwise be included in a bill of rights. 208 Beyond the argument
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George Wythe, Virginia Ratifying Convention, in id. at 656.
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The Federalists – neither James Madison, George Wythe nor the rest – were not
“contending that these rights and all others were best protected by leaving them unenumerated,”
Barnett, The Ninth Amendment, supra note 32, at 28, except to the degree that the enumerated
powers scheme secured them.
208

The Federalists never contended that the enumerated powers scheme would secure each
and every right that might be included in a bill of rights. The notion that they contended against the
necessity of a bill of rights based on a “rights-powers conception” of individual rights – where rights
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that a bill was not really necessary, Federalists also feared that a bill of rights might be viewed as
essential and even present the danger of reversing the presumption to one in favor of power, so that
the only security provided for rights would be – as in the state constitutions – the specific limitations
found in the bill of rights.
Specifically, the inclusion of rights in a bill of rights could be construed as in effect implying
powers not intended to be given. 209 A separate concern – articulated most frequently by
Antifederalist opponents of ratification – was that the omission of Article II of the Articles of
Confederation, reserving unenumerated “rights, powers, and jurisdiction,” to the states, could be
read to mean that the federal government would hold general legislative powers. 210

From this

perspective, the Ninth and Tenth Amendments are “explanatory amendments,” both being intended
to control “the expansion of federal power and reserving all nondelegated power and rights to the
states.“ 211 As Professor Lash has noted, “listing certain rights could imply that the only limits to the

are defined invariably and entirely by reference to powers, thus never “trumping” powers – receives
no support from the ratification-era debate over the omission of a bill of rights. See McAffee, The
Court Over the Constitution, supra note 33, at 1532-1535 (critiquing Professor Barnett’s attempt to
defend such a proposition). The Federalists merely believed that a number of the most fundamental
rights, about which Antifederalists were concerned, were adequately secured by the grant of limited
and defined powers – indeed, as “the residuum” of those powers.
209

See ALEXANDER HAMILTON, THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, supra note 55, at 579.
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See supra notes 36-45 and accompanying texts.

211

Lash, Lost Original Meaning, supra note 45, at 358. The term “explanatory amendment”
is Madison’s. 2 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 1901 (JOSEPH GALES ED., 1834) (Feb. 2, 1791) (James
Madison) (referring to the “explanatory declarations and amendments accompanying the ratifications
of the several States”). See also Lash, Lost Original Meaning, supra note 45, at 358-59, 392. Lash
correctly takes the Ninth Amendment as clarifying that “[t]he enumeration of rights must not suggest
a government of unenumerated power.” Id. at 358.
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interpreted scope of federal power were those particular limits listed in the Constitution.”212
But of course from the early days of the republic Americans have disagreed about the
interpretation of federal powers, as well as the scope of the grant of power contained in the
Necessary and Proper Clause. Now it is true that the “explanatory amendments” we call the Ninth
and Tenth Amendments explicitly merely re-state the propositions that the government is one of
delegated and reserved powers – propositions that were thought by many to secure and protect
rights and interests of both states and individuals. They do not purport to tell us – at least not clearly
and explicitly – how national powers are to be construed. 213 Even so, both amendments have come
to figure in the debate over how to interpret the powers granted the national government, and the
Necessary and Proper Clause, and each has been used at various times, by courts or commentators
(and sometimes both) to warrant a restrained construction of either the powers themselves or the
Necessary and Proper Clause.
When Madison presented his proposed amendments to Congress, he noted that many were
anxious for a provision stating that “the powers not therein delegated should be reserved to the
several States.” 214 Admitting that such a provision may be “deemed unnecessary,” he concluded
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Lash, Lost Original Meaning, supra note 45, at 361.
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It is still true that the Virginia Ratifying Convention proposal, from which the Ninth
Amendment was drafted, did specifically prohibit an inference of extended powers from the
inclusion of limits on powers elsewhere in the Constitution (or Bill of Rights). Even so, it was
Madison who was emphatic that “preserving retained rights and constraining federal power
amounted to the same thing and that the final version [of the Ninth Amendment] continued to
express the same federalist principle demanded by the state conventions.” Lash, Inescapable
Federalism, supra note 54, at 808. See supra notes 103-106 and accompanying text.
214

1 Annals of the Congress of the United States 441 (Joseph Gales ed., 1791) (1834).
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that “there can be no harm in making such a declaration, if gentlemen will allow that the fact is as
stated.” 215 So “Madison stated his belief that the proposed Tenth Amendment probably was not
necessary, but that expressly declaring the principle was considered important to the state
conventions.” 216 As we have noted, it is no coincidence that similar language generally reserving all
not granted was proposed by every state ratifying convention that proposed amendments. 217
A. Madison’s Opposition to Hamilton’s National Bank
Madison and other Federalists had argued against a bill of rights on grounds that a sufficient
security for rights grew from the fact the “every thing not granted is reserved,” and, further, that the
implication of general legislative powers might be drawn from a bill of rights.218 This is precisely
why Madison could contend, as he did, that there was no real distinction between Virginia’s
Seventeenth proposed amendment and the Ninth Amendment’s final language that referred to
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Id. The view Madison expressed in Congress is the view commonly accepted as the
modern reading by which the Tenth Amendment is viewed as “[d]eclaratory of overall constitutional
scheme” and “had no independent force as originally understood.” CHARLES LOFGREN, The Origins
of the Tenth Amendment: History, Sovereignty, and the Problem of Constitutional Intention, in
GOVERNMENT FROM REFLECTION AND CHOICE: CONSTITUTIONAL ESSAYS ON WAR, FOREIGN
RELATIONS, AND FEDERALISM 113 (1986). See MCAFFEE, BYBEE, & BRYANT, POWERS RESERVED,
supra note 37, at 40.
216

Lash, Lost Original Meaning, supra note 45, at 360.
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See supra note 38 and accompanying text. In addition, Antifederalists would lobby hard
“to change the wording of what would eventually become the Tenth Amendment–to restrict the
powers of the new government to those expressly delegated by the Constitution.” SAUL CORNELL,
THE OTHER FOUNDERS: ANTI-FEDERALISM AND THE DISSENTING TRADITION IN AMERICA, 1788-1828,
at 244 (1999) (emphasis added) [hereinafter cited as THE OTHER FOUNDERS]; Dry, The
Antifederalists and the Constitution, in ANTIFEDERALISM, supra note 100, at 39 (listing five state
conventions that proposed limiting Congress’s powers to those “expressly” or “clearly” delegated).
218

See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
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retained rights. 219 Federalists believed that the limited grant of federal power was adequate to secure
freedom of the press and freedom of religion, but also perceived the danger that the specific
provision for such freedoms could generate an inference of a power to regulate such topics. They
were thus anxious to make clear “what the Federalists claimed were principles already implicit in the
structure of the Constitution.” 220
At the same time, the omission of a Bill of Rights could only be defended if Congress’s
powers were not interpreted to “give an unlimited discretion to Congress.” 221 In opposing
Hamilton’s bill that would create a national bank, Madison concluded that Hamilton had articulated
the doctrine of implied powers so as to “reach every object of legislation, every object within the
whole compass of political economy.” 222 According to Madison, “an implication of the critical
premise that these are limited grants of power is that there is a barrier to the exercise of a ‘great and
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See supra notes 105-106 and accompanying text.
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Lash, Lost Original Meaning, supra note 45, at 391-92. A related point is that “the
Founders generally viewed rights and powers as two sides of the same coin.” Id. at 400. Hence
“limiting powers and securing rights amount to the same thing: the extension of one results in the
disparagement of the other.” Id. See also McAffee, Original Meaning, supra note 43, at 1226,
1291.
221

James Madison, Gazette of the United States (Philadelphia), Feb. 23, 1791, reprinted in 14
Documentary History of the First Federal Congress, 1789-1791, at 371 (William Charles
DiGiacomantonio et al., eds, 1995) [hereinafter cited as Documentary History]. Madison’s speech
opposing the bank bill is discussed in id. at 388-91. The solution to the problem was clear enough; it
“simply required that the Constitution be interpreted as if the Antifederal amendments had been
passed: strict construction.” Dry, The Antifederalists and the Constitution, in ANTIFEDERALISTS,
supra note 100, at 41.
222

Madison, 14 Documentary History, supra note 221, at 372.
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important power, which is not evidently and necessarily involved in an express power.’” 223 More
than ten years ago, I summarized Madison’s analysis of this issue:
Madison relies on a number of critical factors, including the legislative nature of the
proposed bank’s power to make by-laws, the power granted to purchase and hold real
property, the support the bank would receive from penal regulations and, finally, the
particular point that the bank was effectively granted a monopoly in derogation of the
“equal rights of every citizen.” Madison’s net conclusion is that these factors, when
taken together, show that “the power of incorporation exercised in the bill” may not
“be deemed an accessory or subaltern power, to be deduced by implication, as a
means of executing another power.”224
In the context of this argument for a somewhat restrained reading of enumerated powers,
Madison relied upon both the Ninth and Tenth Amendments. 225 They were the “explanatory
amendments,” both of which excluded from proper interpretation “the latitude now contended.” 226
The Ninth Amendment guarded against “a latitude of interpretation,” and the Tenth excluded “every
source of power not within the constitution itself.” 227 Professor Lash sums up the conclusions
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McAffee, Federal System, supra note 129, at 126, quoting James Madison, 2 ANNALS OF
CONG. 1899 (1791).
224

Id. at 127, quoting James Madison, 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1900 (1791).
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Madison’s focus on the Ninth Amendment may have reflected in part that he had rather
clearly suggested to Congress that the Tenth Amendment may well be redundant and unnecessary.
See supra notes 207-09 and accompanying text. As we will see, however, in the battle over the
Alien and Sedition Act Madison would rely on the Tenth Amendment as having “independent force”
in justifying relatively strict construction of federal power. It should not be surprising, then, that the
Ninth and Tenth Amendments came to be perceived to both embody and reflect governing
assumptions about the nature of our federal system.
226

James Madison, WRITINGS 489 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1989) [hereinafter cited as
WRITINGS].
227

Id. Hamilton’s defense of the bank did not rely on the limiting provisions of the Bill of
Rights to justify an expansive reading of the Necessary and Proper Clause, so it is quite unclear that
either Virginia’s seventeenth proposed amendment or the final text of the Ninth Amendment can be
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Madison reaches in his speech against the bank in this fashion:
The federal government is one of limited enumerated power. All nondelegated
powers are reserved to the states. Unduly broad interpretations of these enumerated
powers would destroy this principle by allowing the government to invade areas of
law reserved to the states. Important powers like those exercised by the Bank Bill are
not appropriately derived by implication but require enumeration.228
Some have contended that Madison’s reliance on the Ninth Amendment reflected that he
perceived the bank as invading an individual right “retained” by the people. 229 Specifically, it is
argued that this is what Madison was referring to in describing the bank as a monopoly that “affects
the equal rights of every citizen.” 230 In truth, Madison never stated or implied that “the monopoly
status of the bank would be a sufficient basis by itself to warrant constitutional objection.” 231 It is,

read as literally applying to the bank problem. Madison’s analysis reflects, however, that the
Federalists came to perceive themselves as seeking to prevent interpretation with the effect of
“levelling all the barriers which limit the powers of the general government, and protect those of the
state governments.” Madison, 14 Documentary History, supra note 221, at 375.
228

Lash, Lost Original Meaning, supra note 45, at 393. Professor Lash concluded: “In his
Bank speech, Madison presented the Ninth Amendment as a rule of construction that preserves the
principle enshrined in the Tenth.” Lash, St. George Tucker, supra note 85, at 1360.
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Randy E. Barnett, Necessary and Proper, 44 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 745, 784-85 (1997); David
N. Mayer, The Natural Rights Basis of the Ninth Amendment: A Reply to Professor McAffee, 16 S.
Ill. L.J. 313, 318-19 (1992).
230

Randy E. Barnett, Foreward: Unenumerated Rights and the Rule of Law, 14 HARV. J. L. &
PUB. POL’Y 615, 637 (1991).
231

McAffee, Federal System, supra note 129, at 128. See Lance Banning, Federalism,
Constitutionalism, and Republican Liberty: The First Constructions of the Constitution, in Liberty
and American Experience in the Eighteenth Century 388, 404 (David Womersley ed. 2006)
(summing up Madison’s arguments against the bank bill with his statement that it would destroy “the
essential characteristic of a government . . . composed of limited and enumerated powers”). Others
who used the Ninth Amendment to oppose the bank, even when the debate concerned renewing its
charter, were clear that their argument was based on federal power and states’ rights, not personal
claims. See Lash, Inescapable Federalism, supra note 54, at 863-65.
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moreover, especially unlikely that Madison would have been relying on a fundamental right against
economic monopolies, in view of his history of opposition to including an antimonopoly
constitutional prohibition in the bill of rights.232 Professor Lash’s conclusions therefore seem
undeniable:
Madison . . . was not arguing that the bank charter violated individual rights. In fact,
Madison expressly stated that the proposed bank charter would “directly interfere
with the rights of the States.” Madison’s reference to the effect of a monopoly on the
equal rights of citizens was in support of his argument that the power to charter a
bank was an important power and, thus, required enumeration. 233
Considering that Madison’s argument was based on a conception of federalism, it is
significant that, despite the full-blown debate within the Washington administration as well as in
Congress, the bill was enacted and signed into law by President Washington. 234 Madison himself
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McAffee, Federal System, supra note 129, at 116-17. Moreover, Jefferson, a prominent
opponent of the national bank and an equally strong proponent of an anti-monopoly provision, did
not rely on unenumerated rights or the Ninth Amendment in opposing the national bank. Id. at 12930 & n. 417. Accord, Lash, St. George Tucker, supra note 85, at 1360-61; Banning, supra note 231,
at 405-406. Maryland also did not rely on individual rights or the Ninth Amendment in arguing the
McCulloch case before the Supreme Court. See id. at 1373.
233

Lash, Lost Original Meaning, supra note 45, at 390, quoting James Madison, WRITINGS,
supra note 18, at 483; accord, Garrett Ward Sheldon, THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF JAMES
MADISON 81 (2001) (treating Madison’s objection to the bank as based on its “interference with the
powers of the states”). Even a strong proponent of using the Ninth Amendment to strictly construe
federal power that would impact on individual interests, St. George Tucker, “saw the bank episode
as an instance of violating the Tenth Amendment – not the Ninth Amendment.” Lash, Inescapable
Federalism, supra note 54, at 860 n. 223. Tucker did not see the bank “as having anything to do
with individual rights,” and therefore perceived only the need to protect “the rights of the states.” Id.
234

See Griffin, supra note 87, at 299-300. Griffin observes that the House and Senate were
“crowded with framers and ratifiers,” id. at 299, and concludes that it is “very unlikely that President
Washington, the ‘Father of our Country,’ would have signed the bill had it been obvious (as Barnett
would have it) that the bank violated the original meaning of the Constitution.” Id. at 300.
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also signed a subsequent law chartering a Second Bank of the United States, a decision that would
seem especially unlikely had he viewed the law as violating a fundamental right of the people. 235 A
narrow reading of the Necessary and Proper Clause also became a prominent feature of nineteenth
century states’ rights constitutionalism.
B. The Dispute Over the Alien and Sedition Acts
The infamous Alien and Sedition Acts, criminalizing sharp criticism of government as
seditious libel, “precipitated the most serious constitutional crisis in the period after ratification.” 236
It led to the adoption of the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, which “drew on the
anticonsolidationist rhetoric that had defined dissenting constitutional discourse since
ratification.” 237 Although the text of the Tenth Amendment does not appear to offer any special
protection to states, beyond what already appears in article I, Section 8,238 it came to be viewed by
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See, e.g., GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 102-03
(15 ed. 2004); SHELDON, supra note 233, at 106-09. Strikingly, one whose views are widely cited
in support of the fundamental rights construction of the Ninth Amendment, James Wilson, was just
as adamant that there was power to create a national bank – a view he contended for even under the
Articles of Confederation.
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CORNELL, THE OTHER FOUNDERS, supra note 215, at 230. For useful summaries of the
debate over the Alien & Sedition Acts, see Kurt T. Lash, James Madison’s Celebrated Report of
1800: The Transformation of the Tenth Amendment, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 167 (2006) [hereinafter
cited as Report of 1800]; McAffee, Federal System, supra note 129, at 130-38.
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CORNELL, THE OTHER FOUNDERS, supra note 215, at 240.
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See the discussion of Madison’s presentation of the Tenth Amendment, at supra notes
207-09 and accompanying text. Randolph objected that the amendment “does not appear to me to
have any real effect, unless it be to excite a dispute between the United States, and every particular
state, as to what is delegated.” Letter to George Washington (Dec. 6, 1789), in 5 Documentary
History of the Constitution of the United States of America: 1786-1870, at 222, 223 (Dept. Of State
ed., 1905), cited in Lash, Report of 1800, supra note 235, at 172 n. 60.
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many as “expressing a rule of narrow, or strict, construction of federal power.” 239 We have seen that
Madison relied on the Ninth and Tenth Amendments to justify his opposition to the bill creating a
national bank and as requiring a fairly strict construction of federal powers; 240 indeed, Madison read
the Ninth Amendment as “a rule of strict construction in order to preserve the principle announced
by the Tenth Amendment.”241 Other commentators, including St. George Tucker, were satisfied that
“the Tenth Amendment itself expressed a rule of strict construction.” 242 Lash concludes: “[A]fter
1800 and for the next 150 years, courts and commentators cited both the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments as expressing rules of strict construction of federal power.” 243
Professor Cornell offered these observations:
In both cases, Jefferson and Madison asserted that the protection of individual liberty
depended upon preserving the balance of power between the states and the federal
government. States’ rights and individual rights continued to be linked in opposition
constitutional discourse. The two documents also adopted the compact theory of
federalism, in which the states were cast as the original parties of the compact that
created the Union. 244
In support of the Virginia Resolutions, Madison offered the view that the challenged act
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Lash, Report of 1800, supra note 235, at 168. See also id. at 170-172.

240

For a useful review of Madison’s congressional speech opposing the bank, see Lash,
Report of 1800, supra note 235, at 172-75.
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Id. at 177.
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Id. at 178. Lash reports that “[a]ccording to Tucker, under the Tenth Amendment, the
Constitution ‘is to be construed strictly, in all cases where the antecedent rights of state may be
drawn in question.’” Id.
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Id.
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CORNELL, THE OTHER FOUNDERS, supra note 215, at 240.
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exercises “a power not delegated by the Constitution.” 245 In his Report on the Virginia Resolutions,
he contended that
it will be proper to recollect that, the federal government being composed of powers
specifically granted, with reservation of all others to the states or to the people, the
positive authority under which the Sedition Act could be passed must be produced by
those who assert its constitutionality.246
The result of Madison’s Tenth Amendment-based argument for strict construction of federal power
was that Madison’s Report of 1800 “became a foundational document for nineteenth-century
advocates of states’ rights.” 247
The principle of a government of limited and enumerated powers continued to be perceived
as both securing the autonomy of state and local governments, but also as protecting rights. In his
Kentucky Resolutions, Jefferson stated that
“the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by
it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people”; and that, no
power over the freedom of religion, freedom of speech, or freedom of the press, being
245

Id. Lash points out that Madison relied on the Tenth Amendment “which declares, that the
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are
reserved to the states, respectively, or to the people.” Lash, Report of 1800, supra note 235, at 182
(citing Madison, Report on the Alien and Sedition Acts (1800), in Writings 608 (Jack N. Rakove
ed., 1999).
246

James Madison, Madison’s Report on the Virginia Resolutions, 4 Elliot’s Debates, supra
note 24, at 546, 561. Professor Cornell observed that a leading congressional opponent, Albert
Gallatin, contended that the only way to prevent the subversion of the Constitution was to interpret it
in strict terms. “In doubtful circumstances the language of the text was to be construed so as to limit
power, not increase it.” CORNELL, THE OTHER FOUNDERS, supra note 215, at 232. Gallatin even
referred to “strict adherence” to the terms of the First Amendment. Id.
247

Lash, Report of 1800, supra note 235, at 182. Some have found it almost startling that
“the Federalist Alien and Sedition Acts” provoked Madison “to advocate a states’ rights position,”
that would be widely perceived as inconsistent with “the understanding of Madison the founder.”
Dry, The Antifederalists and the Constitution, in ANTIFEDERALISTS, supra note 100, at 41.
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delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states,
all lawful powers respecting the same did of right remain, and were reserved to the
state or to the people. 248
As the debate turned in part on the meaning and implications of rights found in the First
Amendment, its opponents argued for a broad reading of the First Amendment, as well as a narrow
construction of federal power, without offering a separate argument that the law was “improper”
(thus violating the Necessary and Proper Clause) or violated the Ninth Amendment. Another
consequence of the debate is “that Madison’s Tenth Amendment-based argument against the Acts
had the effect of eclipsing the Ninth as the core constitutional provision requiring the strict
construction of federal power.” 249
C. The Commentaries of St. George Tucker and the Ninth Amendment
In the early years of the American republic, concerns that the national government be one of
“limited” powers, thus preserving both personal and states’ rights, became important themes in the
constitutional thought of Jeffersonian republicans. 250 Perhaps the first major constitutional
commentator, St. George Tucker, a Jeffersonian republican, 251 believed that the Bill of Rights “was
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Thomas Jefferson, Kentucky Resolutions (Nov. 10, 1798), in 5 THE FOUNDERS
CONSTITUTION 131 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds. 1987).
249
Lash, Report of 1800, supra note 235, at 182.
250

Clyde N. Wilson, Foreward, in TUCKER, VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 55, at xi.
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Wilson sees Tucker as “the exponent of Jeffersonian republicanism.” Id. at xii (emphasis
added). Accord, David Thomas Konig, St. George Tucker and the Limits of States’ Rights
Constitutionalism: Understanding the Federal Compact in the Early Republic, 47 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1279, 1294 (2006) (describing Tucker as an “ardent Jeffersonian”); Robert M. Cover, Book
Review, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 1475 , 1476 (1970) (reviewing ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE’S
COMMENTARIES WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, reprint ed.. 1969)
(asserting that Tucker’s volumes “stand as a singular example of an attempt to translate Jeffersonian
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to reassert the limited nature of the new government’s powers and their dependence solely on the
delegation of the people of the several sovereign states.” 252 As an advocate of a state-compact
theory of the Constitution, 253 Tucker clearly held a “state-centered perspective.” 254 Like other
states’ rights commentators of his era, Tucker held the view that “the people” (not in general but
those of the several states) had conferred powers on the federal government, “but only those
expressly delegated.” 255
Tucker underscored that the powers of the federal government under the Constitution “are
limited,” while “the states, in all unenumerated cases, are left in the enjoyment of their sovereign and
independent jurisdictions.” 256 Without question Tucker uses both the Ninth and Tenth Amendments
to justify a strict construction of federal powers and does so to secure the rights both of the states and
of American citizens.257 The issue that divides commentators concerns whether Tucker’s strict

political theory into law,” and concluding that “[n]o other commentator of such pure Jeffersonian
pedigree and persuasion ever wrote”).
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Wilson, in VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 55, at xii.
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Lash, St. George Tucker, supra note 85, at 1350; Cover, supra note 251, at 1488.
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G. EDWARD WHITE, THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE 1815-1835, at 86
(ab. ed. 1991).
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Konig, supra note 250, at 1299.
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TUCKER, VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 55, at 93. To Tucker it was clear that
“state governments not only retain every power, jurisdiction, and right not delegated to the United
States, by the constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, but they are constituent and necessary
parts of the federal government.” Id. at 91.
257

Professor Cornell summarized Tucker’s views this way:
The protection of individual liberty, according to this view, could be
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construction of federal power, at least under the Ninth Amendment, centered on securing individual
natural rights, or was at least equally, if not exclusively, to the end of preventing an expansive
reading of national authority, to the detriment of state autonomy.258 Lash contends that “both the
Ninth and Tenth Amendments have their roots in the state ratification conventions, which called for
provisions expressly limiting the construction of federal power to preserve the autonomy of the
states.” 259 Accordingly, “[i]n his Bank speech, Madison presented the Ninth Amendment as a rule
of construction that preserves the principle enshrined in the Tenth.” 260
Professor Lash observes that under the federal Constitution retaining a right generally “meant
leaving the matter to state control (assuming the Constitution did not also expressly bind the states in

accomplished only in a properly balanced federal system in which the federal
government was limited to those powers expressly delegated by the Constitution.
The only means for protecting the integrity of the federal system was to adhere to a
philosophy of strict construction. By limiting the scope of federal authority to the
narrow grant that the states had made during ratification, federalism and liberty would
be preserved.
CORNELL, THE OTHER FOUNDERS, supra note 215, at 273.
258

Compare Barnett, The Ninth Amendment, supra note 27, at 69-71 (reading Tucker as
asserting that the Ninth Amendment “provides a rule of construction” when “liberty” is at stake),
and BARNETT, RESTORING, supra note 92, at 242 (Tucker was clear that “the end of constitutional
construction is the protection of individual liberty”), with Lash, Inescapable Federalism, supra note
54, at 815-17 (asserting that the two goals – of preventing enlarged power and securing retained
rights – “were inextricably linked”). At least some who concur with Professor Lash – of which I am
one – perceive the rights “retained” as those secured by a reading of federal powers that preserves
some “state autonomy.”
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Lash, St. George Tucker, supra note 85, at 1351. The conventions, according to Lash,
perceived the Constitution as needing “a rule preventing unduly broad construction of enumerated
federal authority–a means of ensuring that the people of the individual states would retain significant
autonomy over those matters thought best left to local control.” Id. at 1355-56.
260

Id. at 1360.
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the same matter).”261 Thus even though the First Amendment prohibits Congress from enacting a
law “respecting an establishment of religion,” states were free to establish religion in the decades
following adoption of the Bill of Rights.262 Madison’s use of the Ninth Amendment to justify strict
construction of federal power in the bank controversy, notwithstanding the absence of a fundamental
rights issue, confirms that the Ninth Amendment came to be conceived as a guarantee of state and
local autonomy and a restrained construction of federal power. 263
It does not appear that Tucker himself conceived of his reliance on the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments as consisting of the securing of unnamed rights, independently defined and enforced.
In his 1803 commentary, Tucker suggested that “the disquisition of social rights where there is no
text to resort to, for their explanation, is a task, equally above ordinary capacities, and incompatible
with the ordinary pursuits, of the body of the people.” 264 In defending the Constitution’s Bill of
Rights, Tucker concluded that “[b]y reducing speculative truths to fundamental laws, every man of
the meanist capacity and understanding may learn of his own rights, and know when they are
violated.” 265 Tucker is clearly committed to the strict construction of federal power, but does not
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Lash, Inescapable Federalism, supra note 54, at 831.
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See supra notes 206-231 and accompanying text.
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1 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, APPENDIX TO BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF
REFERENCE TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES
AND OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 154-55 (Philadelphia: William Young Birch and
Abraham Small, 1803) [hereinafter cited as APPENDIX TO BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES].
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TUCKER, VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 55, at 246.
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appear as a likely candidate for explicating implied fundamental rights.
Tucker’s commitment to the written Constitution is a standard view of the founding era; it is
also, as Professor Cover observed, exemplary of a view that amounted to constitutional
positivism. 266 That Tucker, despite his commitment to (and interest in) rights, subscribed to a
constitutionally positivist view, is clear from his record as a judge. Among other things, Tucker
wrote one of the opinions in Hudgens v. Wright, 267 disapproving of Judge Wythe’s dictum that read
Virginia’s Inherent Rights Clause – stating the “free and equal principle” – as invalidating the entire
institution of human slavery. 268 From any reasonable positivist perspective, it is difficult to quarrel
with the judgment of the court in Hudgens, given that the language of the proposed Inherent Rights
Clause was amended purposely to avoid threatening slavery. 269
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See supra notes 134-136 and accompanying text.
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1 Hen. & M. 134, 11 Va. 134 (Va.), 1806 WL 562 (Va.).
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The case is usefully discussed in WHITE, supra note 254, at 685-87; COVER, JUSTICE
ACCUSED, supra note 134, at 51-55; Paul Finkleman, The Dragon St. George Could Not Slay:
Tucker’s Plan to End Slavery, 47 Will. & Mary L. Rev. 1213, 1213-216 (2006); Cover, supra note
251, at 1493.
269

See supra notes 148-157 and accompanying text. Tucker’s state-compact theory almost
certainly would mean that “states’ rights” would be his priority in a clash between them and human
rights. Consider these comments about Jefferson:
In 1819-1820, the nation experienced the crisis of the Missouri Compromise. In the midst of
this crisis, it was clear to Jefferson that the threatened rejection of Missouri’s bid for statehood
unless it abandoned its slave system or opened its border to free blacks represented a violation of the
original federal bargain and threatened to undermine Missouri’s sovereign power to determine its
own domestic affairs. PAULINE MAIER, AMERICAN SCRIPTURE: MAKING THE DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE 185 (1998). See Thomas B. McAffee, Does the Federal Constitution Incorporate the
Declaration of Independence?, 1 Nev. L.J. 138, 152 n. 65 (2001). See also DAVID N. MAYER, THE
CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 288-89 (1994).
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D. The Other Rights “Retained” by State Constitutions
It has become common to assert that the Ninth Amendment could not have been designed to
prevent a bill of rights from undercutting the Constitution’s enumerated powers scheme, given that
nineteenth century state constitutions often contained what are often called “mini-Ninth
Amendments.” 270 Most recently, Professor Barnett has contended that the state provisions
“undercut” the view that the Ninth Amendment was intended “to underscore the limited nature of
federal power.” 271 To date, however, no one has responded to the analysis provided in 2001 that
provided historical understanding and explanation for the state constitutional equivalents of the
Ninth Amendment.272
In the single case in which a law was invalidated based solely on reliance on such a state
constitutional provision, In re J.L. Dorsey, 273 the state court read the provision simply as requiring
legislative power to “be derived from an express grant in the constitution.” 274 In short, the court
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JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 203 N. 87 (1980), seems to have been the
first to make this argument in print. Accord, Suzanna Sherry, Natural Law in the States, 61 U. CIN.
L. REV. 171, 187 (1992); Yoo, supra note 49, at 1008-09.
271

BARNETT, RESTORING, supra note 92, at 243. Barnett does not seek to reconcile this
assertion with his own strict construction of federal power whenever it impacts on rights. He does
suggest that such provisions show that the Ninth Amendment was a “declaration of rights,” and not
“a limitation on enumerated powers.” Id. at 244. Yet he does not refer to a single case simply
finding implied limitations on federal powers in favor of rights.
272

See McAffee, Inalienable Rights, supra note 37, at 771-792 (Part entitled “The Other
Rights ‘Retained’ by State Constitutions”). For a similar analysis, with similar conclusions, based
on federal Ninth Amendment decisions, see Lash, The Lost Jurisprudence, supra note 80.
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7 Port. *293 (Ala. 2838).
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Id. *333. Of course, in the process the Alabama court also asserted that the state’s
constitution secures “all these inherent, unalienable rights” from intrusion by the “law making
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read the provision as stating that, just as the federal Ninth was designed to secure the national
government’s enumerated powers scheme, state legislative power was similarly limited to power
expressly enumerated. Unsurprisingly, Dorsey was accompanied by a dissent that stated the view
that dominated the ratification-era bill of rights debate on the subject of state legislative power.275
Perhaps of greater importance is that “the Supreme Court of Alabama has expressly and specifically
rejected the reasoning that supported the holding in Dorsey.” 276 Most importantly perhaps, in the
twentieth century state courts did not rely on Ninth Amendment equivalents to help justify decisions
securing unenumerated fundamental rights, such that there were no state court decisions to rely on
when Justice Goldberg pointed to the federal Ninth Amendment to justify his concurring in Griswold
v. Connecticut. 277
VI.
The Ninth Amendment and Modern Positivism
We have noted that advocates of fundamental, unenumerated rights often write as though it is
modern “positivists,” who are frequently moral skeptics, who comprise the enemies of the proper
historical construction of the Ninth Amendment. They also write as though there were a fairly clearcut dichotomy between advocates of constitutional positivism and advocates of a constitutional

power.” Id. at *324. The case is treated in some depth in Frost, Klein-Levine, & McAffee, Courts
Over Constitutions, supra note 161, at 364-66.
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Dorsey, 7 Port. at *387, *401 (Collier, C.J., dissenting) (“[W]hile the constitutuion of the
United States is an enabling charter, the constitution of the States are instruments of restraint and
limitation upon powers already plenary.”).
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Frost, Klein-Levine, & McAffee, Court Over Constitution, supra note 152, at 366 (citing
Johnson v. Robinson, 192 So. 412, 415 (Ala. 1939).
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381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
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jurisprudence based on natural law and natural rights. There is little doubt that issues related to the
presumed difficulties in identifying and justifying reliance on natural rights that cannot be found in
constitutional text play a role in motivating some to oppose open-ended constitutional adjudication
based on the Ninth Amendment. But when the question is posed as to whether “we can reconcile
our natural law past with our textualist present,” and “whether we even want to,” 278 it is not at all
clear that such a dichotomy accurately describes either modern views or competing readings of the
history. 279 The point is illustrated in the interpretive views offered by two leading Ninth
Amendment theorists who have debated over the original meaning of the amendment.
A. Randy E. Barnett
Professor Barnett, to use one example, appears to be genuinely committed to the idea that the
Ninth Amendment protects all the natural liberty claims of individuals–all the “rights” that the
framers perceived them as having brought with them to the social contract that is governed by the
Constitution. 280 But notice that Professor Barnett’s interpretation is based on the historical and
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Suzanna Sherry, Natural Law in the States, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 171, 222 (1992).
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It is now clear that Professor Sherry has opted for constitutional textualism, albeit without
rejecting a broad (if pragmatic) reading of the Ninth Amendment. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber &
Suzanna Sherry, Desperately Seeking Certainty: The Misguided Quest for Constitutional
Foundations 138-39 (2002) (critiquing Ronald Dworkin’s “moral reading” of the American
Constitution). See McAffee, Foundations, supra note 133.
280

Indeed, one senses that Barnett does not really view the text we call the Ninth Amendment
as particularly crucial to reaching the conclusion that he does. Thus he suggests that if “courts are
bound by the original meaning of the constitutional text,” and yet the text “does not provide any
protection of unenumerated rights,” those embracing such an interpretation “may have won the
constitutional battle, yet lost the legitimacy war.” Randy E. Barnett, Getting Normative, supra note
115, at 111. This would be because “[t]hey would have succeeded only in proving that the
constitution now in effect does not provide what it must provide to make laws that are justified and
81

textual claims that the framers identified the other rights “retained” in the Ninth Amendment by
reference to social contract political theory. If this historical and textual perspective were not
enough of itself to make Professor Barnett a “positivist,” it seems clear that his conclusion that the
federal Bill of Rights, and the Ninth Amendment, did not apply as limits on the powers of state and
local government would be sufficient. 281 A result, he observes, was that “at the founding period and
for decades thereafter, the propriety of state laws received minimal federal scrutiny.”282 The
question raised is: if the rights we retain in entering the social contract “entail enforceable claims
on other persons (including those who call themselves ‘government officials’),”283 why would these
rights limitations not apply to local and state government officials? Moreover, Barnett has been
emphatic that the framers of the Constitution and Bill of Rights held to the principle that
those who enter into social compacts cannot deprive or divest their posterity of these
natural rights regardless of the powers they may delegate to government. They are,
in other words, inalienable. 284
And according to Barnett, the framers viewed these constitutional principles as part of the supreme

bind in conscience.” Id. Though he nowhere explicitly admits it, Barnett is effectively contending
that virtually every American constitution – those governing in the various states – are completely
illegitimate.
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Barnett, The Ninth Amendment, supra note 32, at 72 (“one should not lose sight of the fact
that originally the Ninth Amendment, like the rest of the Bill of Rights, was applicable only to the
federal government;” the Fourteenth Amendment “substantially altered the constitutional structure”);
id. at 74 (“there was no federal jurisdiction to protect the rights retained by the people from
infringement by state governments” until the Fourteenth Amendment). See supra note 35.
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BARNETT, RESTORING, supra note 92, at 320.
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Barnett, Getting Normative, supra note 115, at 106.
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Barnett The Ninth Amendment, supra note 27, 40.
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law of the land, and not as a mere restatement of unenforceable political principle.
The only way to justify Barnett’s idea that the Bill of Rights, and the Ninth Amendment, did
not limit the powers of the states, is by concluding that Justice John Marshall correctly decided
Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore. 285 If Justice Marshall was right, however, it was as a matter of
positive constitutional law, as is illustrated by the existence of so-called Barron contrarians during
the decades following the decision, who often relied on the “declaratory” nature of rights found in
the federal Bill of Rights to justify their decision to ignore its holding. 286 But if the Ninth
Amendment refers to inalienable natural rights, Professor Barnett at least owes readers an
explanation as to why it limits only the national government, given the argument that the amendment
embodies a decision to “vest these rights in the people, rather than in any government.” 287 There is a
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32 U.S. (7 Pet. 243 (1833). For defenses of Barron, see DOUGLAS W. KMIEC & STEPHEN
B. PRESSER, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER: HISTORY, CASES, AND PHILOSOPHY 752 (2d
ed. 2004) (finding “that the Court is correct on this point, as a glance at any of the better histories of
the period will confirm”); Thomas B. McAffee, Reed Dickerson’s Originalism – What it Contributes
to Contemporary Constitutional Debate, 16 S.I.U. L.J. 617, 651-57 (1992).
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AMAR, CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 13, at 145-156. Professor Amar
observes that:
From the 1830s on, antislavery crusaders began to develop, contra Barron, a
“declaratory” interpretation of the Bill of Rights that viewed the Bill, not as creating
new or merely federalism-based rules applicable only against federal officials, but as
affirming and declaring preexisting higher-law norms applicable to all governments,
state as well as federal. According to this declaratory view, for example, although the
First Amendment directly regulated Congress, it also affirmed a preexisting right to
free expression.
Akhil Reed Amar, The Creation, Reconstruction, and Interpretation of the Bill of Rights, in THE
NATURE OF RIGHTS, supra note 91, at 163, 165.
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Calvin R. Massey, Federalism and Fundamental Rights: The Ninth Amendment, in 1
RIGHTS RETAINED, supra note 48, at 291, 335.
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large group of legal scholars who have read the Ninth Amendment as applying by its terms to
limiting the powers of the states. 288
Barnett correctly concludes, of course, that Justice Marshall was right in holding that the Bill
of Rights was never intended to limit the powers of state governments. It is noteworthy, moreover,
that Madison sought to add a couple of amendments that would limit the powers of the states in
favor of individual rights, 289 and that none of these were adopted. 290 Most of the framers of the
Constitution not only perceived the doctrine of popular sovereignty as embodying sufficient
authority for “the People” to decide whether to “retain” or “surrender” popular rights, 291 but
thoughtful early Americans held the view that “the People” of each and every state were empowered
to determine whether any given right would be retained or surrendered to the state as a matter of
state constitutional law. 292
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E.g., CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM: HUMAN RIGHTS, NAMED AND
UNNAMED (1997); Bennet B. Patterson, The Forgotten Ninth Amendment, in 1 RIGHTS RETAINED,
supra note 48, at 107, 114-30; Norman G. Redlich, Are There Certain Rights . . . Retained by the
People?, 37 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 787, 805-806 (1962).
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Madison would have added to article I, section 10: “No State shall violate the equal rights
of conscience, or the freedom of the press, or the trial by jury in criminal cases.” I Annals of the
Congress of the United States (Joseph Gales ed., 1834). Madison’s proposals are also at 1
BARNETT, RIGHTS RETAINED, supra note 48, at 55. That Madison was insightful and recognized the
need to limit the states if the rights of the people were to be secured is clear in the history. See
McAffee, supra note 204, at 655-56 (noting that Thomas Tudor Tucker opposed Madison on the
ground that “the states were interfered with too much already”).
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See McAffee, supra note 204, at 656 (setting forth basis for conclusion that “Madison’s
attempt to add to the limits imposed on the states failed”).
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See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
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See supra note 173 and accompanying text (referring to Professor Lutz’s amply supported
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Strange as it may seem, Professor Barnett asserts quite confidently that the right to “alter and
abolish” a form of government deemed to be “adverse or inadequate to the purpose of its
institution,” is among mankind’s “unalienable” rights secured by the Ninth Amendment. 293 Beyond
the right to alter or abolish, Barnett contended that the Ninth Amendment’s “retained rights” include
at least the right to religious freedom, the right to defend life, liberty and property, the right
emigrate, the right of assembly, and the right to free speech. 294 The conclusion: it is clear to Barnett
that “[n]o originalist of any stripe should accept less than the protection of all these liberties.”295
There is only one problem: there cannot possibly be both a strongly – and invariably, given the idea
of “inalienability” – protected right to religious freedom as well as a strongly protected right for the
community to “alter or abolish” a form of government the community has come to deem
inadequate to the purpose of its institution. 296
Professor Barnett does not appear even to be aware that there is an unresolved tension

claim that state constitutions’ drafters “assumed that government had all power except for specific
prohibitions contained in a bill of rights”).
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BARNETT, RESTORING, supra note 92 at 257-58, citing 1 Annals 452 (Madison’s proposed
amendment to be added to the preamble). Barnett does not explain how to reconcile his own
reliance on the collective right to “alter or abolish” government with the view that the “consent of
the governed” is simply a fiction that does not contribute to the legitimacy of government. See supra
note 92 and accompanying text.
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Id.
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Id. at 258.
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As an illustration, Professor Lash observes that “although the First Amendment prohibits
any law respecting an establishment of religion, states remained free to establish religion as they
pleased in the decades following the adoption of the Bill of Rights (and they did).” Lash,
Inescapable Federalism, supra note 54, at 831.
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between his insistence that the Ninth Amendment refers to inalienable natural rights and his equally
adamant claim that the inquiry called for merely authorizes “supplementation” of the Constitution’s
“express terms in ways that do not contradict their original meaning.” 297 If one takes seriously the
task of engaging in the natural rights adjudication suggested by Barnett’s reading of the Ninth
Amendment, it would raise doubts about the constitutional validity of all morally controversial
enactments of positive law, including provisions of our written Constitution. Consequently if a
Supreme Court justice were convinced that “equal representation of jurisdictions of unequal
population violates the principle of one person, one vote,” Professor Barnett should explain why that
justice should not hold that “the equal representation of the fifty states in the Senate” is
unconstitutional. 298 Barnett has to date not supplied anything approaching an adequate ground for
reading a provision dedicated to “inalienable liberty rights” as one that creates an “exception” that
invariably upholds positive law that happened also to be written – and ratified – as fundamental
law. 299
Sooner or later, we must choose which is more central to our constitutionalism: (1) the
content of the decision made, which might include the precise elements of the rights characterized as
“inalienable,” or (2) the “authority” to make the decision about the appropriate content of our rights
and the appropriate limits on government power, an authority traditionally thought to be held by the
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BARNETT, RESTORING, supra note 92, at 108.

298

The example is borrowed from Michael W. McConnell, A Moral Realist Defense of
Constitutional Democracy, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 89, 97 (1988). For analysis of an attempted
response to this objection, see McAffee, Utopian Vision, supra note 129, at 534-47.
299

For similar analysis of another advocate of the unenumerated fundamental rights
construction of the Ninth Amendment, see McAffee, Foundations, supra note 155, at _____.
86

sovereign people as they ratified (or chose not to ratify) proposed constitutions. 300 If we choose to
construe apparently open-ended rights clauses as enforceable at the highest level of generality, it is a
decision to be ruled by judges. 301 Some contend that it is a matter of choosing to be governed by the
natural rights we properly have and deserve. But others, such a Professor Soper, observe that when
judges feel free to implement natural law, “the system remains positivist in the most significant
sense, with the judge simply serving as the sovereign in place of the legislature.” 302 Read
consistently with the history of the inherent rights clause of the Virginia Bill of Rights, the question
is not simply whether a right is properly understood to be “inalienable,” but whether there was

300

As I once observed,

[t]he very concept of inalienable rights is one that limits, at least in moral and
political theory, the power of the people. But the founders were just as clear that the
power of sovereignty is unlimited as they were that there are inalienable rights. So
we now face a fundamental question: we can treat the founders as speaking the
sentiments of an unlimited sovereign people on the applicability of a particular right,
or we can choose to view their powers as substantively limited by the “inalienable”
right–but we cannot have it both ways.
McAffee, Inalienable Rights, supra note 37, at 780-81.
301

See, e.g., Rosen, Flag Burning Amendment, supra note 107 (contending that Ninth
Amendment is properly read as invalidating proposed amendment authorizing flag desecration laws).
But see Frost, Klein-Levine, & McAffee, Courts Over Constitutions, supra note 161, at 358 (taking
opposing view).
302

Philip Soper, Some Natural Confusions About Natural Law, 90 Mich. L. Rev. 2393, 2415
(1992). Many assume that since Jefferson recognized “inalienable” rights, his priority would be on
the rights that cannot be given up. But Jefferson “accepted that ‘every man, and every body of men
on earth, possesses the right of self-government,’” and that “‘the law of the majority is the natural
law of every society of men . . . [and] natural rights, may be abridged or modified in its exercise, by
their own consent, or by the law of those who depute them.’” Shain, Rights Natural and Civil in the
Declaration of Independence, in THE NATURE OF RIGHTS, supra note 91, at 116, 126 (citing 17 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 195 (Julian Boyd et al. ed. 1950–).
87

sufficiently widespread agreement that it should be secured by the written constitution as a limitation
on the exercise of government power. The framers did not equate constitutional and “inalienable”
rights, and they distinguished moral and legal claims. 303
It is also true, of course, as Barnett notes, that “state court judges began to scrutinize the
propriety of state legislation under the ‘law of the land’ provisions in state constitutions to ensure
that such legislation served the general public, as opposed to a faction or special interest.” 304 But
substantive due process decisions have been controversial all the way through American history, and
are not generally thought to embody the original meaning of the due process clause. 305 More
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For a general critique of basing constitutionalism on the idea of “inalienable rights,” see
McAffee, Utopian Vision, supra note 129.
304

BARNETT, RESTORING, supra note 92, at 320 n. 3. For additional perspective on
Nineteenth Century substantive due process decision-making see Frost, Klein-Levine, & McAffee,
supra note 147, at 371-92. Despite being an advocate for some substantive due process decisionmaking, Professor Conkle concludes that the evidence is against the view that substantive due
process was “embraced by the original, objective public meaning of the clause,” and concludes that
its values “emerge from a process of nonoriginalist decisionmaking.” ‘Daniel O. Conkle, Three
Theories of Substantive Due Process, 84 N. C. L. REV. 63, 77-78 (2006).
305

Early in this decade I wrote:

Even a modern advocate of unenumerated rights has concluded that “the very
phrase ‘substantive due process’ teeters on self-contradiction,” and hence “provides
neither a sound starting point nor a directional push to proper legal analysis.” Akhil
Reed Amar, Foreward: The Document and the Doctrine, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 26, 123
(2000). See also id. at 122-23 (describing recent unenumerated rights case as
“invoking the nonmamallian whale of substantive due process, a phantasmogorical
beat conjured up by judges without clear textual warrant”); Charles Black, Jr., A New
Birth of Freedom 3 (1997) (describing substantive due process as “paradoxical, even
oxymoronic”). Professor Black is also not known as an opponent of unenumerated
rights.
Thomas B. McAffee, The Constitution as Based on the Consent of the Governed–Or, Should We
88

centrally, however, it remains true that the view of state legislative power that dominated the 17871788 debate over ratification has remained the predominant view in America’s state courts. Typical
is Louisiana’s assertion that “a state constitution’s provisions are not grants of power but instead are
limitations on the otherwise plenary power of the people of a state exercised through its Legislature,”
which “may enact any legislation that the state constitution does not prohibit.”306 And Kansas stated
that “[w]here the constitutionality of a statute is involved, the question is, therefore, not whether the
act is authorized by the constitution, but whether it is prohibited thereby.”307
The real problem confronting Professor Barnett, however, is not his positivism, but his
history. The notion that valid moral claims, or natural rights, might appropriately limit legislative
power, seems on its face to receive some support from Virginia’s Inherent Rights Clause.308 But the
Inherent Rights Clause itself was almost never viewed as stating enforceable limits on legislative
power, and, consistent with Lockean tradition favoring legislative supremacy, 309 the general rule that

Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 80 Ore. L. Rev. 1245, 1273 n. 130 (2001).
306

Bd of Dirs. v. All Taxpayers, 529 So. 2d 384, 387 (La. 1988).

307

State ex rel. Schneider v. Kennedy, 587 P.2d 844, 850 (Kan. 1978). A decision like
Kennedy is what explains Oliver Wendell Holmes’ quip that, for him, when the issue concerns the
scope of state legislative power, “the question always is where do you find the prohibition–not,
where do you find the power.” VIII OWEN M. FISS, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT: TROUBLED
BEGINNINGS OF THE MODERN STATE, 1888-1910, at 181 (1993) (quoting Letter from Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr., to James B. Thayer, Nov. 1, 1893). The opposite view, in Holmes’ mind, was
“dangerous and wrong.” Id. See Frost, Klein-Levine, & McAffee, Courts Over Constitutions,
supra note 161, at 385-86.
308

For scholars who read the Inherent Rights Clause as providing for enforceable natural
rights, see supra note 147.
309

See, e.g, supra note 133 and accompanying text. Cf. Paul Peterson, Antifederalist
Thought in Contemporary American Politics, in ANTIFEDERALISM, supra note 100, at 111, 127
89

the states’ legislatures held plenary power, subject only to specific limitations spelled out in the state
constitutions’ Declarations of Rights, came to be understood as requiring power-constraining texts if
rights were to be protected.. 310 Madison sought to supply such texts in his proposed federal Bill of
Rights, and the equivalent of Virginia’s Inherent Rights Clause is precisely what Madison proposed
for a “prefix” to the Constitution that retreated to hortatory language and was not intended to be an
operative provision of the Constitution.311 Notwithstanding claims offered by Professor Barnett, the
Inherent Rights Clause had nothing to do with the Ninth Amendment, which was designed to
reaffirm the indirect protection of rights provided by the system of enumerated and limited powers –
this is why it became, with the Tenth Amendment, one of the twin guardians of federalism.
B. Kurt T. Lash
Professor Lash and Professor Barnett sometimes appear to hold substantially the same basic
interpretation of the Ninth Amendment. Each has stated that the Ninth Amendment’s reference to
other rights includes the natural rights referred to as “inherent” in the Virginia Bill of Rights, and
each describes his view as embodying a “Federalist” reading of the amendment that favors relatively
strict construction of national powers, especially when the exercise of national powers threatened the
other rights secured by the Ninth Amendment. Each agrees that the other rights “retained” by the
people, against the national government, included the uniquely individual rights the people are
appropriately viewed as holding, based on nature (or sometimes custom). But Lash is insistent that

(observing that Federalist proponents of the Constitution favored a strong executive “to guard
against the very system of legislative supremacy favored by the Antifederalists”).
310

Frost, Klein-Levine, & McAffee, Courts Over Constitutions, supra note 161, at 362-69.

311

See supra notes146-149 and accompanying texts.
90

the other retained rights of greatest importance were the rights held collectively by the people of
each state:
In addition to individual rights were collective rights, those held by the people as a
collective entity. The most famous of these is announced in the Declaration of
Independence, which declared the people's unalienable right to alter or abolish their
form of government. In the period immediately following the Revolution, all these
rights ran against one's own state government 312
Thus Lash contends that “[a]t the time of the Founding, it was possible to embrace natural rights and
a strong belief in the collective right of the people to local self-government.” 313
So when North Carolina proposed both a “natural rights” provision and the rough equivalent
of Article II of the Articles of Confederation, Lash concludes that the “approach conceives of
retained rights in a collective manner, rather than an individual Libertarian sense. Rights and
powers not delegated to the federal government remain under the collective control of the people of
the individual states.” 314 Lash therefore perceives Barnett’s interpretation of the Ninth Amendment
as somewhat narrowly “referring to nothing more than individual rights.” 315 By contrast, Lash
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Lash, Inescapable Federalism, supra note 54, at 826-27. Indeed, Lash supplies a lengthy
quotation from the work of St. George Tucker directly connecting the right to alter or abolish a form
of government with the Ninth Amendment, id. at 859-60 – a quotation that, as he put it, “explodes
Professor Barnett’s claim that ‘no direct or indirect evidence’ supports Amar’s claim about the Ninth
Amendment protecting this collective right of the people.” Id. at 860 n. 217, citing Barnett, The
Ninth Amendment, supra note 32, at 22.
313

Lash, Lost Original Meaning, supra note 45, at 363. Illustrative was that the federal right
not to have an “established” religion simply did not apply to the states, which frequently did
establish religions. See supra note 260 and accompanying text.
314

Id. at 364.
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Lash, Inescapable Federalism, supra note 54, at 824. Acknowledging that Barnett
sometimes states he believes in “collective rights,” Lash contends that “his overall theory makes
91

underscores his agreement with Professor Barnett that the popular (and collective) right to “alter or
abolish” the form of government one lives under is among the other rights “retained” by the Ninth
Amendment. 316 But it is also clear that he understands what this means and implies.
One implication is that “the concepts of ‘powers’ and ‘rights’ are inextricably linked; a
delegated right is an extension of power, and a retained right is a reservation of power.” 317
Moreover, even the Tenth Amendment’s reference to the “retained rights of the states,” Lash’s
research reveals, acted as “a shorthand reference to the retained right of the people in their respective
states to local self-government.” 318 The collective right of the people to self-government within the
states would thus mean that the Ninth Amendment would secure a state’s right to determine whether
a given individual right should be secured by the state’s constitution. This collective right,
moreover, was undoubtedly limited to some degree by the Fourteenth Amendment, but the “degree
of impact the Fourteenth Amendment has on the Ninth” is necessarily “based on an interpretation of
the enumerated rights and powers of the Fourteenth.” 319 In short, the disagreement between Barnett
and Lash is ultimately a dispute over the proper reading of a positivist written Constitution that turns
on which scholar has more accurately construed its text in historical context.

such a reading impossible.” Id.
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See supra notes 291-294 and accompanying text.
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Lash, Inescapable Federalism, supra note 54, at 860.
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Lash reports that Madison explained that “references to the rights of states can be
understood as references to the sovereign people of a given state.” Id. at 827 n. 88 (Citing James
Madison, Report on the Virginia Resolutions (Jan. 1800), in 6 The Writings of James Madison 348
(Gaillard Hunt ed., 1906) [hereinafter Writings of Madison].
319

Lash, Inescapable Federalism, supra note 54, at 879. For an analogous view of the impact
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of the Fourteenth Amendment, see McAffee, Inalienable Rights, supra note 37.
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